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Volume 100 Lead Piece 
Back to the Future? 
Legal Scholarship in the Progressive Era 
and Today 
Daniel A. Farber† 
“‘Forewords’ are rightly subject to suspicion . . . .”1 
 
It is a great honor to have the opportunity to introduce 
Volume 100 of the Minnesota Law Review. One time-tested ap-
proach on such occasions is to pontificate about the current 
state of legal scholarship. Another is to prognosticate about the 
future of legal scholarship. With depressing regularity, it turns 
out that the future of legal scholarship is very much like the 
prognosticator’s own work. Taking a different tack, I decided to 
look back at the very first issue of the Review, to get a better 
sense of where it started in comparison to where it and other 
law reviews are today. It turned out to be an unexpectedly in-
teresting exercise. Origins are often illuminating, and in the 
case of the Minnesota Law Review, there is much to be learned 
from the Review’s first issue in 1917.2  
 
†  Sho Sato Professor, University of California, Berkeley. I want to ex-
press my appreciation for the Minnesota Law Review’s invitation to write the 
Introduction to Volume 100. I would also like to thank Andrew Bradt, Dianne 
Farber, and Anne Joseph O’Connell for comments on an earlier draft, and 
Joan Howland, Michael Hannon, and Suzanne Thorpe of the University of 
Minnesota law library for their help in tracking down information about the 
Review’s first editors. Copyright © 2015 by Daniel A. Farber. 
 1. William R. Vance, Book Note, 32 YALE L.J. 853, 853 (1923). As dis-
cussed in Part II, Vance was the second Dean of the University of Minnesota 
Law School and his tenure included the time when the law review was found-
ed. 
 2. The reader may wonder how this could be Volume 100 when the 
founding was only ninety-eight years ago. Part of the answer is that Issue 1 
came out in January, so its anniversary will not be until January 2016. And 
the numbering is always one year ahead of the elapsed time, because the first 
volume is numbered as one rather than as zero. Since the law review was zero 
years old when the first issue appeared, the age of the Review is always a year 
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When I looked it up, Issue 1 turned out to be something of 
a surprise in several dimensions.3 Given the reputation of legal 
scholarship before the New Deal, I had expected dry doctrinal 
analysis of problems directly relating to legal practice, which 
means mostly about private law. What I found was something 
different. Much of what I read in Issue 1 was at odds with the 
standard lore about the evolution of American legal scholar-
ship. To begin with, notably, while student-edited law journals 
are thought to be characteristic of American law schools, Issue 
1 was a hybrid, with a faculty-edited article section and a stu-
dent-edited notes section. The early twentieth century is often 
thought to be the heyday of formalism. Yet the Foreword by the 
editor-in-chief unabashedly refers to the need for law reform 
and for law to evolve as society itself changes.4 At least one of 
the articles, dealing with the need for improved child welfare 
laws, is almost exclusively policy oriented.5 And Issue 1’s lead 
article was written by a political scientist, not a lawyer.6 Alto-
gether, this made Issue 1 far more “modern” than I expected. 
We are often told that law today is far more international 
than in the past, and also that law reviews no longer address 
the practical needs of lawyers and judges as they used to.7 The 
implications are that in the old days, the reviews gave little 
room to international or comparative law and focused only on 
problems that would arise in litigation. But only one of the four 
articles in Issue 1 could provide any direct assistance to law-
 
behind the volume number. 
 3. Throughout this Article, “Issue 1” will refer exclusively to Issue 1 of 
Volume 1, although I will also discuss some articles in the first issue of Vol-
ume 100. The latter issue will be referred to as the “current issue” throughout. 
 4. See infra text accompanying notes 159–63. 
 5. See infra text accompanying notes 234–49. 
 6. See infra text accompanying note 293–310. 
 7. One of the best known such complaint in modern times came from 
Judge Harry Edwards, a former Michigan law professor: 
[M]any “elite” law faculties in the United States now have significant 
contingents of “impractical” scholars, who are “disdainful of the prac-
tice of law.” The “impractical” scholar—that is the term I will use—
produces abstract scholarship that has little relevance to concrete is-
sues, or addresses concrete issues in a wholly theoretical manner. As 
a consequence, it is my impression that judges, administrators, legis-
lators, and practitioners have little use for much of the scholarship 
that is now produced by members of the academy. 
Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the 
Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 35 (1992). For more recent complaints 
in a similar vein from judges (including Chief Justice Roberts), see Adam 
Liptak, The Lackluster Reviews That Lawyers Love To Hate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
21, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/22/us/law-scholarships-lackluster-
reviews.html. 
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yers (and that on a rather obscure subject), while two of the 
remaining three have international scope. The first article in 
the Issue discusses a recent case involving American neutrality 
on what proved to be the eve of World War I—the article itself, 
advocating stricter adherence to neutrality, appeared only 
weeks before German attacks on U.S. ships pushed America in-
to the war.8 The second article is a comparative study of the law 
of negotiable instruments, with a view to deciding what ap-
proach should be incorporated in a future American codification 
(now Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code).9 The third ar-
ticle did have possible utility for practicing lawyers; it ad-
dressed property rights to underwater lands such as lake bot-
toms.10 The fourth article advocates new legislation dealing 
with child welfare and juvenile courts.11 Admittedly, the stu-
dent comments mostly deal with more workaday legal issues 
along with a couple of constitutional topics,12 but the faculty-
 
 8. See C. D. Allin, The Case of the Appam, 1 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1917).  
 9. See Ernest G. Lorenzen, The Rules of the Conflict of Laws Applicable 
to Bills and Notes: A Study in Comparative Law, 1 MINN. L. REV. 10 (1917). 
The Uniform Commercial Code does not appear to address this issue even to-
day. Under § 3-305(a)(1)(i)–(ii), minority age and lack of capacity are defenses 
good against even a holder in due course, but the Code does not specify what 
law applies in determining capacity. See U.C.C. § 3-305(a)(1)(i)–(ii) (2002). 
Comment 3 to § 1-301 of the UCC now states a preference for application of 
the Code to transactions because of its “comprehensiveness, by the policy of 
uniformity, and by the fact that it is in large part a reformulation and re-
statement of the law merchant and of the understanding of a business com-
munity which transcends state and even national boundaries.” U.C.C. § 1-301 
cmt. 3 (2008).  
 10. See Oscar Hallam, Rights in Soil and Minerals Under Water, 1 MINN. 
L. REV. 34 (1917). 
 11. See Edward F. Waite, New Laws for Minnesota Children, 1 MINN. L. 
REV. 48 (1917). 
 12. A listing of the student notes is instructive: 
A. Note, Accident Insurance—Murder by Beneficiary—Accidental Death—
Recovery by Estate, 1 MINN. L. REV. 66 (1917). 
B. Note, Negotiability of a Bill of Lading Under the Federal Bills of Lad-
ing Act, 1 MINN. L. REV. 68 (1917). 
C. Note, Carriers Liability to Bona Fide Holder of Order Bill of Lading Is-
sued Without Actual Receipt of Goods, 1 MINN. L. REV. 70 (1917). 
D. Note, Unconstitutionality of Legislative Fiat Defining Property—Right 
to Labor as Property—Injunction to Protect Personal Rights, 1 MINN. L. 
REV. 71 (1917) [hereinafter Property Rights Note]. 
E. Note, Breach of Statutory Duty as Negligence Per Se, 1 MINN. L. REV. 
76 (1917). 
F. Note, Liability of the Initial Carrier Under the Carmack Amendment for 
Losses Occurring on the Lines of Connecting Carriers, 1 MINN. L. REV. 79 
(1917). 
G. Note, Husband and Wife—Action by Wife Against Husband—Personal 
Tort—Married Women’s Act, 1 MINN. L. REV. 82 (1917) [hereinafter Hus-
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edited section seems focused on law reform or international is-
sues. 
Issue 1 also reminds us of how deeply legal scholarship is 
embedded in the concerns of its time, the article about Ameri-
can neutrality being the most striking example. In many re-
spects, Issue 1 seems redolent of the Progressive Era, which 
was then—unknown to the participants—near its end. This is 
particularly apparent in the article on child welfare, which hits 
some strikingly modern notes in its general argument about so-
ciety’s responsibility to prevent abuse or neglect and particular-
ly in its solicitude for children born outside of marriage. This 
view was fifty years ahead of the U.S. Supreme Court.13 Yet the 
article also shows the darker side of the Progressive movement, 
with a defense of eugenics and a passage showing what we 
might consider today to be striking racial insensitivity.  
In general, Issue 1 is much more like today’s legal scholar-
ship than I expected. The historical era also had some strong 
resemblances to our own: progressives battling with champions 
of small government, accompanied by worries over America’s 
role in the world. In contrast, law schools themselves were far 
different than today’s institutions, in ways that were some-
times startling. And Issue 1 was strikingly different from cur-
rent law reviews in one respect: it included four articles, seven 
student comments, and seventeen short case notes, plus a 
Foreword14 and a report from the state bar association15—all in 
106 pages. The current issue of the Review also contains four 
articles, but many fewer student works, while still requiring 
many more pages. No reader of the modern law review will re-
gard this as unusual; the only surprise may be that “‘twas not 
 
band and Wife]. 
The last note is particularly interesting. It argues that married women 
should be allowed to sue their husbands for battery or negligent personal inju-
ry, although the author suggests that a legislative solution might be best given 
the important issue of public policy involved. Husband and Wife, supra note 
12, at 84. It is intriguing to see this interest in issues of domestic violence at a 
time when women did not yet even have the right to vote. 
These notes are followed by very brief discussions of seventeen recent cas-
es. This degree of productivity is especially impressive considering the small 
size of the student staff (a total of fifteen, including three officers). 
 13. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968) (holding that denial of 
right of recovery because a person is a non-marital child of the deceased vio-
lates the Equal Protection Clause); Glona v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 
U.S. 73, 75–76 (1968) (overturning the Louisiana wrongful death statute bar-
ring recovery for damages to the parent of a non-marital child). 
 14. See Henry J. Fletcher, Foreword, 1 MINN. L. REV. 63, 63–66 (1917). 
 15. See Stiles W. Burr, The Minnesota State Bar Association, 1 MINN. L. 
REV. 98, 98–104 (1917). 
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always thus.” 
In this Article, I will put Issue 1 into context, or rather, in-
to several contexts: the evolution of the American law school 
and the University of Minnesota Law School in particular, the 
origins of the student law review, and developments in legal 
thought at the turn of the previous century. I will then examine 
the articles in Issue 1 in terms of both their intellectual and in-
stitutional context and that of the major historical events that 
were happening outside of law school walls. By telling the story 
of Issue 1, I hope to illuminate issues about legal scholarship 
and its evolution more broadly. 
The fascination that many people feel with genealogy 
seems to reflect the basic sense of the importance of knowing 
one’s origins. On the whole, the legal academy seems to be very 
unreflective about its own origins and development. There are 
relatively few serious scholarly works on the subject, and most 
students and legal academics have only a vague idea of how the 
modern law school came into existence and developed. This Ar-
ticle can be considered, then, an effort to help bring to light the 
genealogy of the world that we live in as students, legal aca-
demics, and lawyers. 
I.  THE LAW SCHOOL IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH 
CENTURY   
Most law students probably assume that law schools have 
always been more or less like they are at the present: three-
year post-graduate programs undertaken by nearly all aspiring 
lawyers and taught by full-time faculty. But law schools were 
very different places in the early twentieth century. The out-
lines of the modern law school were beginning to emerge, but 
the differences seem almost as great as the similarities. Law 
reviews are an unquestioned feature of the law school land-
scape today, but they too have changed over time, as has the 
scholarship they publish. Part I provides a brief introduction to 
the history of law schools, law reviews, and legal scholarship. 
Part II will then turn specifically to a case study and describe 
how the process of evolution played out at the University of 
Minnesota Law School.  
A. FROM THE ORIGINS TO LANGDELL 
In the nineteenth century, states did not require a law de-
gree or even a college degree to become a lawyer.16 Many law-
 
 16. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 463 (3d 
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yers joined the bar after clerking as apprentices in an attor-
ney’s office and with no other legal training.17 The apprentice 
system involved studying some standard primers, copying the 
contents into notebooks, and learning from a lawyer in the 
workplace.18 In the earlier part of the nineteenth century, law 
schools encountered hard times—Harvard had dwindled to a 
single student in 1829 and was resuscitated that year only by a 
combination of fortuities: the merger of an existing proprietary 
law school into Harvard and the hiring of Justice Story as a lec-
turer.19 Law school tuition at Harvard during this early period 
was set at $100, the same fee lawyers charged for studying law 
in their offices.20 In that setting, it is not clear how law schools 
managed to attract students. But perhaps the motivation, both 
at the university law schools and the proprietary ones, was the 
“middle-class urge to get ahead through structured education” 
as opposed to the chaotic setting of law office education.21 
Nevertheless, academic law schools seemed to lead a tenu-
ous existence. Yale Law School also came close to disappearing 
in 1845 and again in 1869.22 Each time it was kept alive by help 
from local lawyers in the New Haven area.23 Part-time lecturers 
were the norm among law school teachers; it was not until 1904 
that Yale had its first full-time faculty member, renowned Con-
tracts expert Arthur Corbin.24 Until the 1870s, Yale Law School 
occupied only a single smelly room in a downtown building over 
a storefront.25 It then made a deal with the local bar, which ar-
ranged to get the school free space on the third floor of a new 
county courthouse, in return for allowing local lawyers to have 
 
ed. 2005).  
 17. Id.  
 18. See John H. Langbein, Blackstone, Litchfield, and Yale: The Founding 
of the Yale Law School, in HISTORY OF THE YALE LAW SCHOOL: THE TERCEN-
TENNIAL LECTURES 19 (Anthony T. Kronman ed., 2004) [hereinafter Langbein, 
Blackstone]. 
 19. Id. at 23. 
 20. Christopher C. Langdell, The Harvard Law School, 1869–1894, 2 
HARV. GRADUATES’ MAG. 490 (1894), reprinted in 1 THE HISTORY OF LEGAL 
EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES: COMMENTARIES AND PRIMARY SOURCES 
518 (Steve Sheppard ed., 1999). 
 21. ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM 
THE 1850S TO THE 1980S 22 (1983).  
 22. Langbein, Blackstone, supra note 18, at 36. 
 23. John H. Langbein, Law School in a University: Yale’s Distinctive Path 
in the Later Nineteenth Century, in HISTORY OF THE YALE LAW SCHOOL, supra 
note 18, at 59 [hereinafter Langbein, University]. 
 24. Id. at 60. 
 25. Id. at 61. 
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access to Yale’s law library.26 In short, it survived on handouts 
from the lawyers nearby. 
Slowly the tide began to turn. Aspiring lawyers, at least in 
the East, were frustrated by the apprentice system because ac-
cess to the best positions was controlled by the elite at the top 
firms. Moreover, by 1900 lawyers no longer needed apprentices 
to act as “copyists, gophers, and drones,” because of the advent 
of professional stenographers and typists.27 Law schools began 
to take off. The number of law schools rose from 15 in 1850 to 
102 in 1900; from 1870 to 1894, the student population rose 
from 1600 to 7600.28 Most university law schools had to be self-
supporting, and it was an innovation when Michigan began to 
pay faculty out of university funds.29 
Today, entering law students expect to read judicial opin-
ions in “casebooks” and to be called on in class to tell the facts 
and holding. But this form of legal education was not always so. 
In general, according to legal historian Lawrence Friedman, 
law schools were dedicated to formalism and abstraction in the 
days before the case method, focusing dogmatically on internal 
logic of the law, with the basic aim of cramming students with 
rote learning.30 
The case method now familiar to every American law stu-
dent was introduced at Harvard in the later nineteenth century 
by Christopher Columbus Langdell, whom Professor Grant 
Gilmore unkindly describes as “an essentially stupid man who, 
early in his life, hit on one great idea to which, thereafter, he 
clung with all the tenacity of genius.”31 Gilmore’s sarcasm was 
misplaced. Langdell had led a difficult life, having lost his 
mother when he was seven, worked in the mills, and worked 
his way through high school and college with help from two sis-
ters, who also worked in the mills to help support him.32 By the 
time he was a law student himself, his eyes were so bad that 
other students had to read the materials to him.33  
From 1870 to 1895, Langdell served as Dean of Harvard 
Law School, where he introduced the use of cases as the mate-
 
 26. Id.  
 27. FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 464. 
 28. Id.  
 29. Id. at 465. 
 30. Id. at 467. 
 31. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 38 (2d ed. 2014). 
 32. See THE CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 1817–
1917 223–25 (1918) [hereinafter CENTENNIAL HISTORY]. 
 33. Id. at 226. 
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rial studied by students.34 Langdell’s approach to legal educa-
tion was based on the premise that the law was a science, with 
the law library as its laboratory;35 his championship of the im-
portance of the law library should make him the patron saint of 
law librarians. Langdell was a conceptualist who “believed that 
the very fact that law was scientific meant that it could be re-
duced to a few fundamental rules and principles.”36  
Langdell also began a new approach to faculty hiring. He 
maintained that “[w]hat qualifies a person, therefore, to teach 
law, is not experience in the work of a lawyer’s office, not expe-
rience in dealing with men, not experience in the trial or argu-
ment of cases, not experience, in short, in using law, but expe-
rience in learning law.”37 Today’s criticisms about the gap 
between law practice and current legal education and about the 
deficient practical experience of law professors,38 apparently go 
back to the origin of the modern law school. 
Langdell is identified with the Socratic method but it is not 
clear how much or how successfully he used that approach. 
Langdell himself often conducted his classes as lengthy mono-
logues; apparently his eyesight was so impaired that he had 
difficulty calling on students.39 When he did, his efforts at ques-
tioning were apparently not well received. One day, there was a 
“hurricane of derisive clapping and stamping” when a student 
turned the tables and began asking him a series of pointed 
questions.40 Langdell himself was not a popular teacher; stu-
dents called him an “old crank.”41 When he began to use the 
 
 34. SAMUEL WILLISTON, LIFE AND LAW: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 76 (1940). 
According to Williston, at the outset  
[t]he case method was primarily a method of study rather than of 
class-room instruction, involving as it did references to the original 
sources of the law, but Ames especially, followed by Keener and to 
some extent by the other teachers used the cases for class-room dis-
cussion in which the students took a large part.  
Id. 
 35. LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927–1960 11 (1986). 
 36. Id. Kalman suggests that his approach to law was an offshoot of his 
amateur interest in botany, with both focusing on taxonomy and classification. 
Id.  
 37. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE HIGH CITADEL: THE INFLUENCE OF HARVARD 
LAW SCHOOL 37 (1978).  
 38. For example, consider Judge Edwards’ lament that “[t]he simple truth 
is that there is no coherent bridge between legal education and the practice of 
law.” Harry T. Edwards, Reflections (on Law Review, Legal Education, Law 
Practice, and My Alma Mater), 100 MICH. L. REV. 1999, 2005 (2002).  
 39. CENTENNIAL HISTORY, supra note 32, at 232–33. 
 40. SELIGMAN, supra note 37, at 35. 
 41. KALMAN, supra note 35, at 12. 
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case method at Harvard, his class dwindled to seven students.42 
It was really his disciple (and successor as Dean), James Ames, 
who successfully established the use of the Socratic method in 
the law schools. Ames was a classic Socratic teacher who “ques-
tioned much” and “answered little.”43 The Socratic method 
meant teaching students to extract the fundamental principle 
from each case for themselves.44 It was this aspect of active 
learning that led the President of Harvard to compare this ap-
proach with the one used in Montessori schools.45 
Sometimes this process might seem to the student like a 
badgering cross-examination of a hostile witness,46 but the goal 
was to lead the student on a path of intellectual discovery. A 
biographer’s description of the law school teaching of Harlan 
Fiske Stone, later Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, at 
Columbia shows at least what the method aspired to. Stone 
would use a series of questions and answers, “kindly but firm-
ly,” until the “the student was made to see for himself the point 
the teacher was trying to bring out.”47 The goal, in Stone’s view, 
was “leading of the entire class, step by step, through the intel-
lectual processes by which the cases are analyzed and com-
pared and their true legal significance developed.”48 
As Stone’s biographer admitted, this approach was not al-
ways appreciated by students, who would have preferred a 
more direct explanation of the law.49 This type of Socratic 
teaching still survives today, especially in first year classes, but 
generally only in diluted form. Unlike its original use, it is no 
longer associated with the idea that existing doctrines need lit-
tle change and “should be applied ‘with constant facility and 
 
 42. FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 470. 
 43. CENTENNIAL HISTORY, supra note 32, at 177–78. 
 44. KALMAN, supra note 35, at 12. The hope, in any event, was that hav-
ing to work out the meaning of the cases themselves would not only develop 
the analytic skills of the students but would also result in greater retention of 
the substance. See JOSEF REDLICH, THE COMMON LAW AND THE CASE METHOD 
IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOLS: A REPORT TO THE CARNEGIE FOUN-
DATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING 29 (1914).  
 45. Charles W. Eliot, Langdell and the Law School, 9 HARV. L. REV. 518 
(1895), in 1 THE HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra 
note 20, at 512. 
 46. This image is found in popular depictions such as the movie, THE PA-
PER CHASE (Twentieth Century Fox 1973). 
 47. ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 
90 (1956). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
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certainty to the ever-tangled skein of human affairs.’”50  
Besides the bar’s unhappiness with the new-style teachers 
and their lack of practice experience, there was also controver-
sy about their methods.51 One criticism was that the case meth-
od seemed designed to produce litigators rather than lawyers 
who knew the rules and could steer clients away from any dan-
ger spots.52 The new-style teachers were also criticized for lead-
ing students to think of themselves as “hired gladiators” able to 
take either side of a dispute on behalf of a client.53  
Yale was a long-time holdout from the case method, follow-
ing the text-and-recitation method, where students read text-
books describing the law rather than cases and then answered 
questions about them in class.54 Nevertheless, the case method 
soon caught on. By 1902, twelve law schools had switched en-
tirely to the case method and another forty-eight used it in 
part.55 Langdell also pioneered other features of the modern law 
school: requirement of a college degree for entrance; a three-
year program (which was accepted only slowly); and a system-
atic ordering of the curriculum, with introductory courses des-
ignated for the first year, rather than allowing students to take 
whatever courses they wanted in whatever order.56  
These developments at Harvard had national impact, but it 
was not overnight. For example, as we will see, Minnesota 
lagged behind in establishing a law school at all and then in 
adopting the Harvard case method. But first we need to consid-
er how another familiar feature of the modern law school, the 
student law review, came into existence. 
B. THE ORIGIN OF THE STUDENT LAW REVIEW 
Law reviews are now a fixture of law school life. It is some-
thing of a surprise to learn that they were a somewhat late ar-
 
 50. SELIGMAN, supra note 37, at 36. 
 51. As one indication, Boston University Law School was founded due to 
unhappiness with the Harvard approach. Id. at 35. Unhappiness with the case 
method lingers today. Ralph Nader’s introduction to Seligman’s book lambasts 
the case method, which he called “a highly sophisticated form of mind control 
that trades off breadth of vision and factual inquiry for freedom to roam in an 
intellectual cage.” Id. at xv.  
 52. STEVENS, supra note 21, at 57. 
 53. Id. at 59.  
 54. Langbein, University, supra note 23, at 55. 
 55. FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 471.  
 56. SELIGMAN, supra note 37, at 38–42. The portion of the Langdell agen-
da that took the longest to be adopted by other schools was the requirement of 
a college degree; no other school followed Harvard’s lead until 1916. Id. at 44. 
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rival, and one that did not instantly take hold. Minnesota and 
some other schools initially involved students only in a subsidi-
ary role, with the faculty running the show.  
To say that law reviews are a relatively recent arrival is 
not to say that there were no legal publications until then. 
Commercial law reviews addressing the national market 
emerged around the time of the Civil War.57 One of these early 
reviews, the American Law Register, eventually evolved into 
the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, but it did not have 
student editors until later.58 Another review, the American Law 
Review—perhaps the leading law journal of the nineteenth cen-
tury—included “scholarly lead articles, honestly critical book 
reviews, news of legal events having regional and national in-
terest, and contributions from the best available legal minds.”59 
The first student law reviews, then, were not entering an un-
tapped market. Student journals did not arrive until the late 
nineteenth century. 
Despite some short-lived precursors, first at Albany,60 and 
then at Columbia, the first enduring student law review was 
launched at Harvard on April 15, 1887.61 It had becomingly 
modest ambitions: 
Our object, primarily, is to set forth the work done in the school with 
which we are connected, to furnish news of interest to those who have 
studied law in Cambridge, and to give, if possible, to all who are in-
terested in the subject of legal education, some idea of what is done 
under the Harvard system of instruction. Yet we are not without 
hopes that the REVIEW may be serviceable to the profession at large.62 
The Harvard students were apparently inspired by the 
 
 57. See Michael L. Closen & Robert J. Dzielak, The History and Influence 
of the Law Review Institution, 30 AKRON L. REV. 15, 31–32 (1996).  
 58. Id. at 32. The review was founded in 1852 by two leading Philadelphia 
lawyers, Asa I. Fish and Henry Wharton, and then run by an editorial board 
(containing such legal luminaries as Thomas Cooley and J.F. Dillon), but re-
verted to two other Philadelphia lawyers in 1891, one of whom brought the 
journal with him when he became dean of the University of Pennsylvania Law 
School. Joseph P. Flanagan, Jr., Volume 100, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 69 (1951). 
 59. Michael I. Swygert & Jon W. Bruce, The Historical Origins, Founding, 
and Early Development of Student-Edited Law Reviews, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 739, 
758 (1985). 
 60. The Albany Law School Journal was published only for a single year, 
sometime around 1875. Nina Rose, Student-Edited Law Journals: A Brief His-
tory, a Long Legacy, L.J. EDS. (Sept. 23, 2013), https://ljeds.wordpress.com/ 
2013/09/23/history-student-edited-law-journals (containing a photo of an ad-
vertisement for a saloon in the Journal, boasting “the best and coolest lager in 
the city”). 
 61. FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 481. Yale followed suit in 1891 and Co-
lumbia in 1900. Id. 
 62. Notes, 1 HARV. L. REV. 35, 35 (1887).  
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short-lived effort at Columbia.63 At the time, law clubs consist-
ing of eight students were an important feature of Harvard 
Law School; the clubs were primarily devoted to arguing mock 
cases, and the faculty ensured that any interested student 
could join one of these clubs.64 The Harvard publication 
emerged from a group of eight students who called themselves 
the Langdell Club, dedicated to discussion of legal topics, writ-
ing essays, and conducting mock trials.65 The original plan was 
to read the essays to each other at meetings, but this idea “soon 
gave way . . . because ‘it was felt that the . . . writers deserved a 
wider circulation than was originally proposed and the found-
ing of the Harvard Law Review was the result.’”66 A strong sup-
porter on the faculty (and later Dean), James Barr Ames,67 sug-
gested that they turn to alumni for funding, and the president 
of the alumni association, one Louis D. Brandeis, helped organ-
ize funding.68  
Other law reviews followed in due course. At Columbia, 
what became the permanent law review also had grown out of a 
student society organized to promote legal study.69 The stu-
dents had proposed to set up an informal seminar to discuss 
current judicial opinions with the hope of starting a law journal 
 
 63. Closen & Dzielak, supra note 57, at 34. 
 64. WILLISTON, supra note 34, at 76–77. 
 65. Closen & Dzielak, supra note 57, at 35. 
 66. Swygert & Bruce, supra note 59, at 770. Williston also says that “[o]ne 
or two of the earlier essays seemed to them [the students] good enough to de-
serve publication, and from this thought the project took the shape of founding 
a law review.” WILLISTON, supra note 34, at 83. The students were also appar-
ently inspired by rousing speeches at the 250th anniversary of Harvard Uni-
versity: 
Wigmore, later discussing the birth of the journal, bluntly stated that 
the celebration of the 250th anniversary “put pride into our hearts, 
and the conviction that the Harvard Law School had a message for 
the professional world.” 
Swygert & Bruce, supra note 59, at 772.  
 67. Id. at 770–71. 
Ames was a likely consultant because his general availability for 
counseling made him the students’ “best friend” during this period. As 
Joseph Beale, a student founder and later a Harvard law professor, 
recounted: “Ames approved [the idea for the review] without reserve, 
wrote the first leading article, and became the chief advisor and help-
er of the editors throughout his life.” 
Id. For brief descriptions of the first issue of the Harvard, Yale, and Chicago 
law reviews, see generally Editor’s Note, But Cf, . . ., 1 CONST. COMMENT. 3 
(1984). 
 68. Closen & Dzielak, supra note 57, at 35. 
 69. STAFF OF THE FOUND. FOR RESEARCH IN LEGAL HISTORY UNDER THE 
DIRECTION OF JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., A HISTORY OF THE SCHOOL OF LAW 
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 182 (1955) [hereinafter GOEBEL]. 
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on Harvard’s model.70 Michigan presented a different model in 
1901. Although instigated by a suggestion from a student, it 
was edited by the faculty and designed primarily as an outlet 
for faculty work; each faculty member was expected to contrib-
ute an article every other year.71  
C. DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 
The content of the early law reviews was shaped by larger 
trends in legal education. The major trend was toward a for-
malist insistence that law involved only deductive logic applied 
to some fundamental legal principals, without consideration of 
societal context or social values. According to Lawrence Fried-
man, Langdell “purged from the curriculum whatever touched 
directly on economic and political questions, whatever was ar-
gued, voted on, or fought over,” replacing engagement with the 
realities of life with a “worship of the common law” and disdain 
for legislation.72 Thus, law “was an independent entity, a sepa-
rate science; it was distinct from politics, legislation, and the 
opinions of lay people.”73 Friedman also expressed a jaundiced 
view of the legal treatises of the period, which he says were 
“barren enough reading when they first appeared and would be 
sheer torture for the reader today.”74 “[H]umorless, imperson-
al,” the treatises focused on “bare exposition of law,” and were 
typically “empty of philosophy or social science.”75 Harvard 
avoided issues of public law in part because issues relating to 
public policy were controversial and had led to faculty firings in 
other university departments.76  
Another eminent legal historian describes the dominant 
view of legal scholarship at that time as an effort to correct le-
gal errors by tracing legal rules to their origins and identifying 
the general principle behind the rules, so that deviations by 
courts could be ironed out.77 Formalism ruled the day, with a 
 
 70. Id. 
 71. History, MICH. L. REV., http:// michiganlawreview.org/history (last vis-
ited Sept. 25, 2015). The first student editor-in-chief was selected just before 
World War II. Id. 
 72. FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 471–72. 
 73. Id. at 472. 
 74. Id. at 477. 
 75. Id. at 478–79. 
 76. Robert W. Gordon, Professors and Policymakers: Yale Law School 
Faculty in the New Deal and After, in HISTORY OF THE YALE LAW SCHOOL, su-
pra note 18, at 80. 
 77. Id. at 78. 
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focus on identifying and classifying legal principles.78 
G. Edward White presents a somewhat more nuanced view 
of turn-of-the-century formalism and of its later critics.79 He 
explains formalism as a perspective that views legal principles 
as an essence that is embodied in cases.80 In most cases, appli-
cation of a principle is routine, but in some cases, applying the 
principle requires some tweaking or clarification of its bounda-
ry, a process that allowed the common law to grow.81 Thus, the 
formalists were not necessarily opposed to legal change, but 
they viewed it as happening through slow, incremental revision 
as principles were clarified or subtly reformulated.  
Later perspectives on the formalists were undoubtedly 
shaped by their critics (and to some extent successors), the le-
gal realists. If nothing else, our view of the formalists is inevi-
tably shaped by an implicit comparison with the realists. Ac-
cording to White, the realists saw legal principles as merely 
generalizations based on the cases and therefore “utterly de-
pendent on the facts and consequences of the cases in which 
they had been formulated.”82 Hence, for the realists, the law 
does not consist of a collection of principles but of many cases 
with their own distinctive character.83 The realist account of 
law stressed the temporary and contextual nature of law, as 
opposed to the (relatively) timeless and abstract quality of the 
formalist’s “principles.”84 
II.  LEGAL EDUCATION AT MINNESOTA   
Now that we have seen how the legal academy in general 
developed in the late nineteenth century and the early twenti-
eth century, it is time to take a look at developments specifical-
ly in Minnesota. It was these developments that were to bring 
Issue 1 into being. 
A. THE EARLY YEARS AT MINNESOTA 
The University of Minnesota gained academic stature only 
through some struggle. The “Minnesota Plan,” developed by the 
 
 78. KALMAN, supra note 35, at 46–47. 
 79. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 167 
(2000). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 168. 
 83. Id.  
 84. Id. at 172. 
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then-president of the University,85 William Folwell, was one 
early effort to upgrade the University, including a plan to es-
tablish professional schools.86 The plan failed when Folwell re-
signed in the aftermath of a student demonstration.87 The 
demonstration, a student protest against disciplinary practices, 
was conducted by students wearing blackened faces and Ku 
Klux Klan costumes; the protest came to an abrupt end when a 
professor shot one of the students in the leg.88  
The history of Minnesota’s Law School began with the ap-
pointment of William Pattee as the first dean in 1888 (and its 
only permanent faculty member before 1890).89 Since the Re-
gents required the school to be self-supporting, the new Dean’s 
highest priority was enrollment.90 Essentially, “[t]he more stu-
dents and the more fees, the better.”91 Recruiting students pri-
marily involved persuading them that a law school education 
was better preparation for a legal career than law office study.92 
This emphasis on persuading a larger number of aspiring law-
yers to attend law school was part of a national trend, fostered 
by an 1892 ABA resolution calling for two years of legal educa-
tion.93 By 1900, law schools were the wave of the future in legal 
education.94 
Six years after Folwell’s 1882 forced departure, the law 
school opened in the basement of the main University building 
with thirty-two students in the day program and thirty-five at 
night.95 The school soon became better established, with its own 
building (Pattee Hall) and with the addition of two more per-
manent faculty members (making three in total) within its first 
 
 85. ROBERT A. STEIN, IN PURSUIT OF EXCELLENCE: A HISTORY OF THE 
UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA LAW SCHOOL 10 (1978). 
 86. Id.  
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 10 n.*. It is not clear from the description whether their faces 
were simply darkened to be less visible or whether they were appearing in 
blackface.  
 89. Id. at 3. 
 90. Id. at 7. 
 91. Id. at 8. 
 92. Id.  
 93. STEVENS, supra note 21, at 95.  
 94. FRIEDMAN, supra note 16. 
 95. History, U. MINN. L. SCH., https://www.law.umn.edu/about/history 
(last visited Sept. 27, 2015). Night school enrollment peaked in 1901 with 194 
students. Id. For purposes of comparison, the law school currently has 698 
J.D., 18 international visiting, 2 domestic visiting, and 56 LL.M. students. 
Law School Profile, U. MINN. L. SCH., https://www.law.umn.edu/admissions/ 
law-school-profile (last visited Sept. 27, 2015). 
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decade.96 The small size of the faculty is a reflection of a com-
mon pattern. Full-time law faculty were an innovation of Dean 
Langdell at Harvard; traditionally, teaching was done by prac-
ticing lawyers and judges.97 The admission requirements for the 
law school required either a high school diploma or passing an 
entrance examination.98 By 1911, however, Minnesota was re-
quiring two years of college before law school admission.99 
The spotty admission requirements were not unique to 
Minnesota. At Columbia in the 1890s, fewer than half of law 
students were college graduates compared with about a third at 
Northwestern and Yale, and under one-fifth at Michigan.100 The 
Minnesota curriculum was also typical, covering a small set of 
courses that remained standard as late as the 1920s before ad-
ditions became more frequent.101 The early curriculum was un-
relentingly focused on private law, including the standbys of 
today’s 1L curriculum: contracts, criminal law, property, and 
procedure (in the form of courses on pleading and evidence).102 
Notably, there were no courses on constitutional or administra-
tive law.103  
 
 96. History, supra note 95. The small faculty did not make Minnesota 
unique: Columbia and Harvard reached as many as four faculty members only 
in 1874. STEVENS, supra note 21, at 71 n.90. By way of comparison, in 2015 
Minnesota had sixty-seven full-time law faculty. Law School Profile, supra 
note 95.  
 97. FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 466. 
 98. STEIN, supra note 85, at 11. 
 99. History, supra note 95. Similarly, at the University of Wisconsin, it 
was only in 1905 that the law school began requiring a full year at some col-
lege for admission, and indeed, it was only in 1896 that the admission stand-
ard for law students had been increased to equal elsewhere in the university. 
See Important Dates in the History of UW Law School, U. WIS. L. SCH., http:// 
law.wisc.edu/current/rtf/21.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2015).  
 100. STEVENS, supra note 21, at 45. 
 101. Id. Note that this was a two-year program, which does not seem to 
have been unusual. For instance, Wisconsin added a third year only in 1895. 
Important Dates in the History of UW Law School, supra note 99. According to 
Friedman the three-year degree was an innovation that began at Harvard. See 
FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 466. This requirement began there in 1899, alt-
hough students had had the option of a three-year degree by 1876. Id. at 468. 
 102. STEIN, supra note 85, at 16–17. 
 103. Id. at 17–18. For extensive information on early law school curricu-
lums, see ALFRED ZANTZINGER REED, PRESENT-DAY LAW SCHOOLS IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND CANADA 230–36 (1928); ALFRED ZANTZINGER REED, 
TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW 351, 453–56 (1921). These 
two books are a treasure-trove of information about early law schools. This ar-
ray of subjects traces back to Blackstone’s organizational scheme. See 
Langbein, Blackstone, supra note 18, at 21. Administrative law was introduced 
later, during the Vance years. STEIN, supra note 85, at 58. Similarly, at Har-
vard, constitutional law was not part of the original three-year curriculum. 
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At the end of Pattee’s deanship, the law school was known 
on campus as a source of easy grades for the football team.104 
The next dean was to change all that. William Vance had be-
come dean of Washington and Lee Law School at the age of 
thirty.105 He came to Minnesota from a spot on the Yale facul-
ty.106 Pattee’s goal had been to offer the opportunity to obtain a 
legal education (and to pay fees to the Law School) to as many 
students as possible.107 When Vance became Dean in 1911,108 his 
goal was to give the state a high quality legal bar to serve the 
state as lawyers, judges, and legislators.109 With the support of 
the Regents, Vance began to recruit new faculty members with 
national reputations.110 He also made law school a much more 
serious educational experience for students, as expressed in a 
1913 doggerel: 
No longer does the care-free stude 
Play cards and sing and dance. 
But now they’re plugging night and day, 
Since the advent of Dean Vance. 
. . .  
They don’t shake dice at Louie’s now, 
Nor gamble on the races; 
You’ll find them in the library, 
Always reading cases.111 
As the reference to “reading cases” suggests, Vance intro-
duced the case method and the Socratic approach at Minneso-
ta.112 The case method was sufficiently controversial that, when 
Vance later returned to Yale, he negotiated for a guarantee 
that he would be allowed to use it in class.113 But it was to be-
 
FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 469. At Columbia, public law was taught by a 
separate faculty drawn from the political science department until after the 
retirement of John William Burgess in 1912, when the law school began to 
gradually develop its own program. GOEBEL, supra note 69, at 240–41.   
 104. STEIN, supra note 85, at 32. 
 105. Id. at 37. 
 106. Id. at 40. 
 107. Id. at 41. 
 108. Id. at 40. 
 109. Id. at 41. When he became dean at Columbia, Harlan Fiske Stone 
(later to be Chief Justice) took a similar view. GOEBEL, supra note 69, at 234. 
 110. STEIN, supra note 85, at 49. 
 111. Id. at 55. 
 112. Id. at 56.  
 113. Arthur L. Corbin, William Reynolds Vance, 50 YALE L.J. 195, 195 
(1940). According to a Yale colleague, at least, Vance’s use of the Socratic 
method was not designed to be intimidating: 
He was courteous and patient in the classroom, respecting the dignity 
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come the dominant method of education for nearly a century.114  
Although he agreed that an emphasis on theory would be 
more appropriate in the eastern states where students would 
have a better chance to learn practice skills under the tutelage 
of established lawyers, Vance’s goal at Minnesota was to pro-
duce practice-ready lawyers: 
In the University of Minnesota Law School we are earnestly trying to 
fit our graduates for the actual practice of the law. It is unreasonable 
to expect them to be finished lawyers when they leave the law school. 
How many men are finished lawyers after five years at the bar, or 
even ten? But we are trying to train them so they can institute and 
prosecute to a final conclusion any ordinary court proceeding with 
reasonable safety to the cause intrusted [sic] to them.115 
To teach skills, Vance revitalized the moot court program 
and—decades ahead of his time—established a legal clinic in 
conjunction with the local aid society.116 The model for clinics 
was provided by medical school clinics: “We think we have 
found a way in a plan never before fully tried, so far as I know, 
by which we can provide for law students something of the 
same kind of clinic which medical students find in the hospital 
and free dispensary.”117 One lesson learned from the clinic was 
the difficulty of dealing with small claims (under $10). This led 
Vance to lobby for the establishment of a small claims court, 
resulting in new state legislation in April 1917.118 
A second purpose of a state law school, he said, was to ad-
vance knowledge about the legal system, and for that reason 
Vance called for funding to hire research professors in charge of 
empirical legal research: 
[I]t is loudly alleged and pretty generally believed that there are 
many delays in our courts that could be obviated. Are the delays in 
fact unreasonable, or is it merely a matter of orderly and dignified 
procedure in determining the right of matters in contest? Why not in-
vestigate the records of some important county and demonstrate the 
[right] one . . . .119 
Elsewhere Vance wrote that law professors, in order to 
 
of his students. They felt that they were co-workers with him in the 
search for a better understanding. He did not seek to drive or domi-
nate, but rather to awaken an intellectual curiosity which would 
serve as an enduring stimulus to industry. 
Ashbel G. Gulliver, William Reynolds Vance, 50 YALE L.J. 197, 198–99 (1940). 
 114. STEVENS, supra note 21, at xiv. 
 115. William R. Vance, The Function of the State-Supported Law School, 3 
AM. L. SCH. REV. 409, 411 (1914).  
 116. STEIN, supra note 85, at 59. 
 117. Id. at 412–13. 
 118. Id. at 66. 
 119. Vance, supra note 115, at 414–15. 
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help adapt the law to changing economic and social conditions, 
would need interdisciplinary knowledge and keen skills: “The 
successful accomplishment of this work of adaptation will re-
quire intellectual ability of the very highest order, and wide 
and balanced learning in a field as broad as our social organiza-
tion itself and as varied as human activities and interests.”120 
This task would “demand immense labor, involving the ex-
penditure of much time in research, in comparing, restating, 
remolding, and readjusting our conceptions of the right and 
wrong of social and industrial relations, and our notions of the 
procedure by which the right is to be upheld and the wrong 
prevented.”121 
Vance also had high aspirations for students. Admissions 
became tougher and tougher under Vance,122 requiring comple-
tion of three years of college (with the first year of law school 
counting as the fourth toward a Bachelor’s degree).123  
A member of the Minnesota faculty who ultimately ended 
up at Harvard spoke admiringly of Vance’s deanship.124 Vance 
“found a heterogeneous, indifferent, inefficient study body; he 
made it unified, loyal, industrious and efficient.”125 While 
strengthening the student body, Vance also “built up a faculty 
 
 120. William R. Vance, The Ultimate Function of the Teacher of Law, 3 AM. 
L. SCH. REV. 2, 6 (1911). 
 121. Id. 
 122. The requirement of at least some college education followed the advice 
of law school experts from elsewhere, such as Dean Dwight of Columbia. 
STEIN, supra note 85, at 450. Although Harvard required a bachelor’s degree 
at the beginning of the century, other schools were slow to follow suit, with 
Stanford adopting this requirement in 1924 and George Washington in 1935; 
it was not until the 1960s that accreditation authorities required a four-year 
college degree. FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 542–43. 
 123. STEIN, supra note 85, at 411. Admission standards could sometimes 
have a dark side: 
George T. Strong, writing in his diary in 1874, hailed the idea that 
the Columbia Law School should institute an admission test: “either a 
college diploma, or an examination including Latin. This will keep out 
the little scrubs (German Jew boys mostly) whom the School now 
promoted from grocery-counter . . . to be ‘gentlemen of the Bar.’” 
FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 487. 
 124. E. M. Morgan, William Reynolds Vance, 50 YALE L.J. 199, 200 (1940). 
Gilmore refers to this period as the “great age of the American law school.” 
GILMORE, supra note 31, at 51. 
It may well be that no educational institutions in any country at any 
time have enjoyed the prestige and achieved the success of the dozen 
or so national law school which grew up in the image of Langdell’s 
Harvard. 
Id. While this is an exaggeration, it does attest to the success of the 
Langdellian model that was fostered by Vance at Minnesota. 
 125. Morgan, supra note 124. 
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of full-time teachers recognized as among the most competent 
in the country.”126 And most importantly, he “found a school di-
vorced from activities connected with the improvement of the 
law and its administration; he made it a source to which legis-
lators and law reformers naturally turned for help, with a first-
class Law Review to which the members of the bar gave enthu-
siastic support.”127 
Vance’s faculty hiring was part of a trend. By 1915, there 
was concern that “the practicing lawyer and the professor have 
been getting further and further apart all the time.”128 (Many 
readers will have heard—or made—that complaint them-
selves!) The turn toward more academically-oriented profes-
sors, using the case method, led to complaints about the dis-
tance between law schools and the profession. The bar “worried 
as the leading schools increasingly had students who had no 
contemporaneous practical experience taught by faculty mem-
bers who had little or no experience of practice.”129  
In terms of Vance’s effort to orient the school toward law 
reform based on a wide range of knowledge, this too had paral-
lels elsewhere. By World War I, a few academics were just be-
ginning to think about use of the social sciences to illuminate 
law,130 although the social sciences of the time may not have 
had as much to offer as anticipated.131 Around the same time, 
Roscoe Pound became Dean of Harvard and launched an attack 
on legal formalism.132  
Vance later returned to Yale, where he was considered one 
of the more conservative members of the faculty,133 with a lean-
 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. STEVENS, supra note 21, at 129 n.55. 
 129. Id. at 119. 
 130. Id. at 135. 
 131. Id. at 139. 
 132. Id. at 136. 
 133. KALMAN, supra note 35, at 27. It is unclear whether Kalman was re-
ferring to Vance’s politics or his views on educational policy. In any event, 
Vance appears to have been at least something of a liberal. For instance, in 
the early days of World War I, he wrote an article on speech by dissenters ar-
guing that: 
The theory of construction which seems to the writer to rest upon 
sound principle is that the constitutional guaranty in question was 
intended not only to abolish forever previous censorship of publica-
tions by the government, but also to safeguard the citizen from any 
larger liability for his uncensored publication, or for his public utter-
ance, than was imposed by the rules of the common law as accepted at 
the time of the making of the federal constitution. 
W. R. Vance, Freedom of Speech and of the Press, 2 MINN. L. REV. 239, 255 
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ing toward the Harvard approach to education.134 But his con-
servatism was only relative to the rest of the Yale faculty—he 
was still considered a founder of legal realism, a pragmatic ap-
proach to the law.135 He remained an opponent of legal formal-
ism, opposing the Restatement of Property as a collection of 
“pontificating black letter formulas purporting to restate the 
law of property.”136 He also supported the appointment as Dean 
at Yale of Robert Hutchins, who was considered a radical re-
former.137 Vance retired from Yale in 1938.138 
B. THE CREATION OF THE MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW  
The Minnesota Law Review was founded during the Vance 
years.139 The first editor-in-chief was Professor Henry J. Fletch-
er.140 One former student described Fletcher as a “very distin-
 
(1918). Vance concedes that “it is difficult to determine how to draw the line 
just at the place where criticism of the government and its measures becomes 
opposition to the government and resistance to the laws.” Id. at 240. In terms 
of wartime speech, he concluded that: 
Congress has no power to abridge the right freely to discuss all public 
measures, to expose their defects and urge their alteration or repeal 
by legal methods, to criticise [sic] the constitution and the laws and 
advocate their amendment, and to comment, however severely if only 
it be fairly, upon the conduct of the officers of the government. Such 
adverse comment, so long as it does not tend to excite resistance to 
the law or breach of the peace, though it may be intemperate and un-
reasonable, and possibly vexatious and even harmful, is not seditious. 
Id. at 259. This seems to be somewhat in advance of the Supreme Court’s 
views during the war, since the Court considered it sufficient that a writing 
could persuade its audience “not to aid government loans, and not to work in 
ammunition factories,” Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 625 (1919), 
whereas Vance would have required a showing that the writings would tend to 
lead to illegal actions. 
 134. KALMAN, supra note 35, at 263 n.43. 
 135. Id. at 119. 
 136. Id. at 27. 
 137. Id. at 108–09. 
 138. Id. at 256. 
 139. Wisconsin established its law review three years later. Important 
Dates in the History of the UW Law School, supra note 99.  
 140. STEIN, supra note 85, at 63. Fletcher, hired in 1902, was the fourth 
permanent member of the law faculty. Id. at 443. He taught a wide array of 
courses, including constitutional law, property law, and bankruptcy. UNIV. OF 
MINN., 13 GENERAL CATALOGUE 442–45 (1910). The only publication by 
Fletcher that I have been able to find is Henry J. Fletcher, The Civilian and 
the War Power, 2 MINN. L. REV. 110 (1917) (arguing that the government is 
not bound by the Constitution once Congress declares war). However, he was 
still editor-in-chief when the journal published a student note arguing that 
“[i]t is of the utmost importance to clear away such dangerous misconcep-
tions . . . leading to the rash assumption by the executive of unwarranted pow-
ers, the infliction of grievous wrongs, and the incurring of serious liabilities, 
civil and criminal.” Note, Constitutional Law—Martial Law—Punishment of 
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guished old practitioner—a southern gentlemen type” who 
loved to teach.141 Another former student described him as a 
“very hard working teacher,” though not as impressive as 
Vance and two other professors (all three of whom later depart-
ed for Yale).142 The Review was made possible by funding from 
the state bar association,143 and more than fifty lawyers guar-
anteed its finances for the first three years.144 In 1920, the Re-
view became the official journal of the Minnesota Bar Associa-
tion.145 It took forty years until the Review severed its tie to the 
bar association and the faculty abandoned editorial oversight of 
the review.146  
Although they did not play the lead role, the student edi-
tors were an impressive group. My overall impression is that 
the student Notes and Case Comments provide concise, well-
argued doctrinal analysis of then-current legal problems. A. L. 
Gausewitz, the President of the Review, became a member of 
the Wisconsin faculty,147 and was later the first dean of the 
 
Civilians by Military Court, 5 MINN. L. REV. 540, 542 (1922) (though perhaps 
Fletcher thought the issue was distinguishable because this was an action by 
state government). According to a memorial note: 
Professor Fletcher was a native of Maquoketa, Iowa, and was educat-
ed at the University of Michigan. After a few years of legal practice in 
Minneapolis, he joined the faculty of the Law School of the University 
of Minnesota in 1895, when the school was seven years old. He con-
tinued to teach without interruption until his retirement, because of 
illness, in 1929.  
In Memoriam, 23 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1938). The memorial also notes that “by far 
the greater number of the graduates of the school now living had the good for-
tune to come under his instruction.” Id. 
 141. STEIN, supra note 85, at 408–09. 
 142. Id. at 412. 
 143. Bar associations were relatively recent innovations, or at least it was 
novel for them to serve as anything more than social clubs. The Association of 
the Bar of the City of New York was founded in 1869. FRIEDMAN, supra note 
16, at 495. Membership in state and city bar associations tended to be selec-
tive rather than open to all lawyers. Id. at 497. 
 144. STEIN, supra note 85, at 64. Faculty involvement was not unusual 
during this period. The law reviews at Michigan and Northwestern were also 
faculty edited. Closen & Dzielak, supra note 57, at 12. 
 145. History, supra note 95. 
 146. About Us, MINN. L. REV, http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/about 
(last visited Sept. 27, 2015). At elite schools, the norm was student control. See 
STEVENS, supra note 21, at 127. 
 147. He seems to have been particularly interested in the evidentiary role 
of presumptions. See Alfred L. Gausewitz, Presumptions, 40 MINN. L. REV. 
391, 406–08 (1956); Alfred L. Gausewitz, Presumptions in a One-Rule World, 5 
VAND. L. REV. 324, 333–34 (1952). His work on criminal law was also influen-
tial. See Alfred L. Gausewitz, Considerations Basic to a New Penal Code, 11 
WIS. L. REV. 346, 364, 365–69 (1936). 
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University of New Mexico law school.148 He received an LL.M. 
at Stanford, and was active in the Wisconsin bar and as a con-
sultant to the American Law Institute.149 The Note Editor, 
Charles M. Dale, moved to New Hampshire after World War I, 
where he ultimately became governor.150 Harry W. Davis, the 
Recent Cases editor, was born in Russia and came to the Unit-
ed States as a child.151 He became assistant superintendent of a 
Jewish Orphan Home in Cleveland after graduation.152 He mar-
ried an unusually proactive woman for the times. During the 
war, she worked for the Jewish Aid Society at a settlement 
 
 148. Professor A. L. Gausewitz Appointed Dean of New Mexico Law School, 
1947 WIS. L. REV. 291 (1947).  
 149. Id. at 292. Gausewitz’s granddaughter also pursued a legal career. See 
Nancy Gausewitz Berner, The Uninjured Plaintiff: Constitutional Standing of 
Qui Tam Plaintiffs After Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United 
States ex rel. Stevens, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 783, 798 (2001). 
 150. Briefly, 
He served as mayor of Portsmouth from 1926 to 1928 and 1943 to 
1944; and was a member of the New Hampshire State Senate from 
1933 to 1937 and 1938 to 1939. He also served as senate president 
from 1935 to 1937; and was a member of the Governor’s Council from 
1937 to 1938. Dale next secured the Republican gubernatorial nomi-
nation, and was elected governor by a popular vote in 1944. He won 
reelection to a second term in 1946. During his tenure, a state em-
ployees’ retirement plan was created; tourism and the state’s industry 
were both promoted; and the deficit was reduced. After completing his 
term, Dale retired from political life. He stayed active, working in the 
banking industry, as well as owning and operating the WHEB radio 
station. Governor Charles M. Dale passed away on September 28, 
1978, and was buried in the Valley View Cemetery in Browns Valley, 
New Hampshire. 
New Hampshire Governor Charles Milby Dale, NAT’L GOVERNOR’S ASS’N, 
http://www.nga.org/cms/home/governors/past-governors-bios/page_new_ 
hampshire/col2-content/main-content-list/title_dale_charles .html (last visited 
Sept. 27, 2015).  
 151. Harry Davis Dies at 57, DETROIT HERALD, Dec. 30, 1948 (on file with 
the Duluth Public Library).  
 152. 20 MINN. ALUMNI WKLY, Mar. 21, 1921, at 11 (on file with the Univer-
sity of Minnesota Law School Library). Although the Minnesota area later be-
came rife with anti-Semitism, this was apparently less true before the 1920s: 
In the early years of the 20th century, the University of Minnesota 
maintained a reputation for civility and open-mindedness within the 
Jewish community that would continue through World War I and into 
the 1920s. In contrast to the growing anti-Semitism that emerged lat-
er, particularly in Minneapolis, there was, in the words of one faculty 
member, a “striking difference between the attitude of the University 
of Minnesota and the city in which it was located. The lack of preju-
dice, the fairmindedness, the really democratic spirit of the university 
are so outstanding as to merit special recognition.” 
Tim Brady, A Difference in Tone, U. MINN. ALUMNI ASS’N, http://www 
.minnesotaalumni.org/s/1118/content.aspx?pgid=1383 (last visited Sept. 27, 
2015). The alumni association refers to Davis as one of a pioneering group of 
Jewish students at Minnesota. Id. 
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house in Chicago.153 After the war, Davis went to work for the 
Federal Land Bank of St. Paul.154 He became a prominent at-
torney and civic leader in Duluth,155 while his wife became a no-
table member of the Duluth Jewish community and active ad-
vocate for social welfare, while also finding time to write a book 
about The Fun of Yiddish.156 
The Review editors hoped to bring the law school closer to 
the profession and to make the courts “more truly institutions 
for the administration of justice rather than for the mere me-
chanical application of the rules of law.”157 Moreover, the Re-
view would also provide a public service of a kind especially ap-
propriate to a public university. Public universities in 
particular should be involved in solving a state’s legal prob-
lems, just as the engineering and agriculture faculties contrib-
ute to solving problems in their fields.158 
The Foreword to Issue 1 begins with an apology for foisting 
yet another law review on the world159—a complaint that must 
strike the modern reader as ironic given the explosion of stu-
dent law reviews since then.160 According to the Foreword, the 
goal of the Review was to “survey the entire field of law, in its 
most recent developments,” as reflected in new legislation, ju-
dicial decisions in the United States and England, and the “al-
most imperceptible effect of economic changes upon the devel-
opment of the law.”161 Because law school classes focused on 
current doctrine and its development, there was a risk that a 
“narrow and petrifying legalism” would be imprinted on stu-
dents.162 By providing the opportunity for collaboration between 
 
 153. MINN. ALUMNI WKLY, at 12 (1918) (on file with the University of Min-
nesota Law School Library). 
 154. MINN. ALUMNI WKLY (1919) (on file with the University of Minnesota 
Law School Library). 
 155. Harry Davis Dies at 57, supra note 151. 
 156. Her papers are kept at the Minnesota Historical Society. Ida Blehert 
Davis: An Inventory of Her Papers, MINN. HIST. SOC’Y, http://www2.mnhs 
.org/library/findaids/p2635.xml (last visited Sept. 27, 2015). At the time of 
writing, it was still possible to find an old copy of the Fun of Yiddish on Ama-
zon.com. 
 157. Fletcher, supra note 14, at 65. 
 158. See id.  
 159. See id. at 63. Perhaps the editors would not have been so apologetic if 
they had realized that several hundred additional law reviews would come af-
ter they did. 
 160. The Library of Congress now carries approximately 350 law reviews. 
Law Reviews and Periodicals, LIBR. OF CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/law/ 
help/periodicals.php (last visited Sept. 27, 2015).  
 161. Fletcher, supra note 14, at 63. 
 162. Id. at 64. 
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students and faculty, a law review “ought to do something to 
develop the spirit of statesmanship as distinguished from a dry 
professionalism.”163 
The aims expressed in Issue 1 do not fit well with standard 
descriptions of legal scholarship in the early part of the twenti-
eth century. The Foreword to Issue 1 seems dedicated to the 
goal of public improvement more than the perfection of legal 
“science,” and the preference for the administration of justice 
over “dry legalism” seems out of tune with the formalism iden-
tified with Harvard and the dominant strain of scholarship. 
But formalism, while dominant, did not hold universal sway, as 
clearly was true at Minnesota judging by the editorial and lead 
articles (especially the one on juvenile welfare). 
There were signs of discontent with formalism elsewhere. 
In particular, Yale, which would later become a bastion of legal 
realism, took a different intellectual approach, partly in an ef-
fort to compete with the more prestigious programs at Harvard 
and Columbia.164 It stressed its connections with other parts of 
the university, claiming with a bit of exaggeration to be the 
leading interdisciplinary law school in the country.165 In 1916 
the outgoing Yale dean called for more study into comparative 
law and greater attention to the “legal-political problems which 
the changes in our economic and social life are creating with 
unprecedented rapidity.”166 A Yale faculty member, Wesley 
Hohfeld, called for the use of legal science to make the law 
more efficient, to eliminate worn-out doctrines (like “liberty of 
contract”), and to evaluate the benefits of legislation.167 Thus, 
faculty members would hopefully become active as legal re-
formers.168 Vance may have been influenced in the direction of 
realism by his time at Yale, although it is equally possible that 
he came there with a realist bent and helped contribute to 
Yale’s move in that direction. Or perhaps legal scholarship even 
 
 163. Id.  
 164. Gordon, supra note 76, at 80–81. 
 165. Langbein, University, supra note 23, at 65. 
 166. Gordon, supra note 76, at 82. 
 167. Id. I have to confess that I knew of Hohfeld only as the creator of a 
system for classifying legal relations into duties, licenses, privileges, rights, 
etc. See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions 
as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917). As a result, I imag-
ined him to be a champion of conceptualism, which was obviously an injustice.  
 168. Gordon, supra note 76, at 83. The pragmatist philosophers emerged 
during roughly the same time period, MICHAEL MCGERR, A FIERCE DISCON-
TENT: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 237 
(2003), though I am not aware of any evidence that anyone on the Yale faculty 
had ever heard of them. 
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outside of Yale and Columbia had already begun to shift more 
in the direction of public law and consideration of policy than 
the conventional account suggests.169  
III.  LAW AND LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP IN THE 
PROGRESSIVE ERA   
So far, I have been focusing narrowly on the legal academy, 
first with the development of legal education more broadly and 
then at Minnesota, followed by similar explorations of the early 
law reviews. But to understand Issue 1, we need a broader per-
spective about the times in which it was written and how some 
of the articles reflected the temper of the times.  
A. TEDDY ROOSEVELT, WOODROW WILSON, AND PROGRESSIVE 
POLITICS 
It was a period in some ways not unlike our own and in 
some ways very different (but isn’t that always true?). In 1910 
the population of the United States, almost 92 million, was less 
than a third of the current population.170 About fifteen percent 
of the population was foreign-born,171 only slightly higher than 
the percentage in 2010.172  
While the economy was growing, the benefits were not 
equally distributed: the top one percent owned almost half the 
wealth and got about fifteen percent of the income.173 (Sound 
familiar?) About half the population was working class, per-
forming manual labor for wages rather than owning their own 
businesses or farms.174 Differences between social groups were 
in some ways sharper than they are today. In a society where 
less than one percent of adults had been divorced, the figure for 
the wealthy was ten to twenty times higher.175  
 
 169. For instance, the Harvard Law Review for 1916–1917 probably had a 
majority of private law articles, some on subjects like suretyship that have 
dropped out of the law school curriculum. However, there were several public 
law articles. See generally Table of Contents, 30 HARV. L. REV. iii (1916). 
 170. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL & BENNO C. SCHMIDT, JR., THE JUDICIARY AND 
RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT 1910–1921 9 (1984) (Oliver Wendell Holmes De-
vise History of the Supreme Court of the United States, vol. 9). 
 171. Id. 
 172. See The Foreign-Born Population in the United States, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/newsroom/pdf/cspan_fb_slides.pdf (last visit-
ed Sept. 27, 2015). 
 173. BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 170. 
 174. MCGERR, supra note 168, at 15. 
 175. Id. at 11. 
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Life expectancy differed sharply between different groups 
at the turn of the last century. A child born to a white-collar 
family in Detroit in 1900 had a life expectancy of fifty-three 
years; the life expectancy for a working class child was five 
years less, and the life expectancy of a child of Polish immi-
grants was only forty-one.176 The country was becoming more 
urban, with a major shift toward cities in terms of population 
and wealth.177 The surge in immigration continued into the new 
century, with over a million immigrants arriving in 1905 
alone.178 There were also shifts in family patterns, with women 
engaging in more activities outside the home, and couples mar-
rying later and having fewer children.179 
Given the demographics, it may be no surprise that class 
conflict was a visible of life in early twentieth century America. 
There were several, frequently violent, strikes with national 
impact in 1892 and 1894.180 A 1902 strike by coal miners 
threatened to leave the eastern United States without enough 
coal for heating, and the strike was settled only by the active 
intervention of President Theodore Roosevelt, who forced the 
mine owners to agree to arbitration.181 
Roosevelt’s presidency represented the arrival of the Pro-
gressive movement to national influence. Progressivism has 
been called “the creed of a crusading middle class.”182 The 
movement sprang from concerns about the unbridled free mar-
ket after a serious depression and two serious bank panics.183 
Progressives believed that only government could limit private 
power as the free market would benefit society rather than 
serving as a source of abuse and predation.184 It was govern-
ment’s responsibility to:  
establish rules for business, to guarantee unions and cooperatives 
rights to organize and pursue collective action, to regulate the hours 
of work in areas of federal jurisdiction, to maintain a creative compe-
tition among firms, to keep prices reasonable (through competition 
and a low tariff) and to create public central banking and credit insti-
tutions.185 
 
 176. Id. at 17. 
 177. Id. at 30. 
 178. Id. at 33. 
 179. Id. at 44–45, 51–52. 
 180. Id. at 55. 
 181. Id. at 118–25. 
 182. Id. at xiv. 
 183. Elizabeth Sanders, Rediscovering the Progressive Era, 72 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1281, 1290 (2011). 
 184. Id.  
 185. Id. 
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The Progressive crusade resulted in tangible legislative 
changes. At the state level, there was considerable legislative 
ferment. State laws addressed a wide range of matters relating 
to the workplace, all of them now familiar parts of the economic 
order. They prohibited child labor, set maximum work hours, 
and set workplace safety standards.186 These measures were not 
part of a coordinated program and varied considerably between 
states.187 But “[t]aken collectively . . . they represented a strik-
ing enlargement of the domain of government power.”188  
At the national level, the Progressives were responsible for 
a great deal of important new legislation. Between 1910 and 
1920, Congress enacted legislation creating the Federal Re-
serve,189 established an agricultural extension service to im-
prove farming practices,190 formed the Federal Trade Commis-
sion,191 set up the Labor Department,192 banned child labor,193 
enacted an eight-hour day law for railroad workers,194 and en-
acted an income tax.195 Other innovations included the first se-
rious efforts at conserving national forests, the creation of the 
Departments of Commerce and Labor, and health regulations 
in the food and drug industries.196 The constitutional views of 
the opponents of the Progressives were in some ways similar to 
those of current conservatives regarding the importance of 
safeguarding property and liberty from over-extensions of fed-
eral and state power.197 But it may surprise readers in the early 
 
 186. OWEN M. FISS, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE 1888–
1910 155 (1993) (Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court 
of the United States, vol. 8). 
 187. Id. at 151. 
 188. Id. at 155. 
 189. KENDRICK A. CLEMENTS, THE PRESIDENCY OF WOODROW WILSON 43 
(1992). 
 190. Id. at 58–59. 
 191. Id. at 50. 
 192. Id. at 77. 
 193. CARL H. CHRISLOCK, THE PROGRESSIVE ERA IN MINNESOTA, 1899–
1918 5 (1971). 
 194. Id. 
 195. CLEMENTS, supra note 189, at 39. 
 196. PAUL JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 629 (1997). 
 197. Their worldview is well-summarized by a recent writer: 
Convinced that theirs was the only true interpretation of the Consti-
tution, constitutional conservatives presented themselves as warriors 
in an epic struggle between individualism and collectivism. For them, 
the Progressive reforms culminating in the New Deal would have the 
effect of supplanting individual liberty with servitude of the individu-
al to the state. It thus represented a challenge to the Constitution it-
self. 
Paul Kens, Revision of Progressive Era History Continues, 50 TULSA L. REV. 
2015] BACK TO THE FUTURE? 29 
 
twenty-first century, to learn that the sharp debates over pro-
gressive reforms did not fall along partisan lines. In Congress, 
progressive measures were backed by Democrats from the 
South and the West, along with Midwestern and Western Re-
publicans.198  
The Progressive movement also had a darker side, includ-
ing its tolerance of segregation (sometimes shading into actual 
support for Jim Crow laws),199 coupled with a patronizing atti-
tude toward African Americans.200 President Wilson himself 
was genteelly, but unmistakably, racist and supported segrega-
tion of black federal workers.201 Progressives were also attract-
ed to eugenics as a means of social improvement in a way we 
would find very disturbing today.202 In short, some progressive 
ideas became building blocks of modern society, others now 
seem signs of a less enlightened era.  
Progressives were near at hand for a law school located in 
Minnesota, but its supporters were not who you might expect. 
Political divisions were complicated. Today, big cities are asso-
ciated with liberalism, but in Progressive Era Minnesota, the 
Progressive “base” consisted of the non-urban middle class, 
with small-town residents from places like New Ulm and Long 
Prairie emerging as leaders in the movement.203 The Twin Cit-
ies business community was ambivalent but opposed progres-
sives on many issues.204 Ethnic divisions were also important, 
given that more than two-thirds of the population of Minnesota 
had foreign-born fathers in 1905.205 The German-American 
community rejected progressivism, partly because it was identi-
 
519, 523 (2015).  
 198. Sanders, supra note 183, at 1282. 
 199. MCGERR, supra note 168, at 180–81. 
 200. Id. at 194–96. See also CHRISLOCK, supra note 193, at 3 (belief in 
white biological superiority “inhibited solid identification with the Negro 
rights movement”). 
 201. CLEMENTS, supra note 189, at 45. 
 202. It has been said that “the eugenics movement was the dark underside 
of the Progressive Movement with its desire to apply principles of efficiency to 
the management of government and to delegate control of social welfare pro-
grams to a professionally trained class of experts.” Seemingly, eugenics was 
the experts’ solution to problems of crime and economic dependency. Kevin E. 
Grady, A Review of Three Generations, No Imbeciles: Eugenics, the Supreme 
Court, and Buck v. Bell, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1295, 1296 (2010) (despite 
Holmes’ statement in Buck v. Bell that three generations of idiots are enough; 
description does not apply to any of three involved in the case, including the 
one who was subjected to compulsory sterilization). 
 203. CLEMENTS, supra note 189, at 22. 
 204. Id. at 25–30. 
 205. Id. at 32. 
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fied with Prohibition,206 while Norwegian-Americans were at-
tracted to progressivism, in part for the same reason the Ger-
man-Americans were opposed.  
The strength of support for progressivism in Minnesota is 
indicated by the fact that in 1912 Teddy Roosevelt carried the 
state as a third-party Progressive candidate, with Wilson a 
close second, and the Republican conservative Taft far be-
hind.207 At the movement’s high point in 1915, Minnesota Pro-
gressives succeeded in enacting some important state legisla-
tion, including a county-option plan for liquor, a law creating 
regulatory jurisdiction over telephone companies, a state-wide 
pension plan for public school teachers, and a liberalization of 
the workers’ compensation law adopted just two years earlier.208 
Under the influence of the Progressives, the government 
attempted to take on novel and untested roles. The legal sys-
tem was then confronted with the question whether to respond 
by adapting to these new rules or attempting to undo them. As 
we will see in Section B, judicial responses were inconsistent 
but often the latter approach held sway. 
B. LAW AND THE MODERN REGULATORY STATE 
Judicial opinions from the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth century have not, on the whole, enjoyed a favorable repu-
tation today.209 With characteristic pungency (and not-
uncharacteristic hyperbole), Grant Gilmore remarked that the 
“few people—including myself—who have ever spent much 
time studying the judicial product of the period have been ap-
palled by what they found.”210 After the Civil War, he says of 
the state courts, “the supply of great judges seemed, almost 
 
 206. Id. at 34. 
 207. Id. at 55. 
 208. Id. at 87. 
 209. It has been suggested that the increasingly activist role of the courts 
after the Civil War was linked to a change in the nature of legal education: 
Thus, the decline of the broad view of academic legal education after 
the midpoint of the nineteenth century may be attributed not so much 
to the triumph of the Harvard model of legal education as to the tri-
umph of the judiciary. . . . As lawmaking power increasingly became 
concentrated in the judiciary, training for public service increasingly 
became synonymous with training in private law for those preparing 
to practice before the courts. Academic legal education could no longer 
aspire to provide any broader training for citizenship and public ser-
vice when citizenry and legal profession alike were preoccupied with 
the pursuit and protection of private gain. 
Charles R. McManis, The History of First Century American Legal Education: 
A Revisionist Perspective, 59 WASH. U. L.Q. 597, 643 (1941). 
 210. GILMORE, supra note 31, at 54. 
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overnight, to vanish,” and “it is hard, even for someone who is 
familiar with the literature, to summon up the name of a single 
judge.”211 Gilmore contended that judges seemed to “start from 
the assumption that the law is a closed, logical system,” so that 
the “judicial function has nothing to do with the adaptation of 
rules of law to changing conditions.”212 Rather than explaining 
the reasons for their decisions, “[i]t was enough to say: The rule 
which we apply has long been settled in this state (citing cas-
es).”213 It was the great age of the string citation.214 Lawrence 
Friedman agrees that the “work of the average judge in 1870 or 
1900 seems plainly weaker than the average work of 1830.”215 
On the whole, the courts aligned themselves with business 
against workers. Although they upheld protections for women 
and children—considered to be weaker groups in need of pro-
tection216—the courts of this period have been called the “long-
time enemy of organized, assertive wage earners.”217 They pro-
hibited union shop contracts in which employers agreed to hire 
only union workers, upheld suspension of habeas corpus during 
a violent strike, held that union activities were subject to the 
anti-trust laws, and issued injunctions against sympathy 
strikes and secondary boycotts.218  
At the Supreme Court, there were major constitutional de-
velopments.219 In the decade prior to the launch of the Minneso-
ta Law Review, the Court handed down its momentous decision 
in Lochner v. New York, striking down a maximum-hours law 
for bakers as a violation of their freedom of contract.220 Similar-
 
 211. Id. at 55. This is surely an exaggeration: Gilmore must have been fa-
miliar at least with Chief Justice Thomas Cooley in Michigan, author of a fa-
mous treatise on constitutional law, and Judge John Dillon in Iowa, a leading 
authority on the rapidly burgeoning subject of municipal law. 
 212. Id. at 56. 
 213. Id. at 56–57. 
 214. Id. at 56. 
 215. FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 476 (emphasis omitted). 
 216. MCGERR, supra note 168, at 137. 
 217. Id. at 143. 
 218. Id. at 144–53. 
 219. Revisionist constitutional historians argue that these cases reflected 
“mapping out the boundary between public power and private rights as judges 
sought to apply constitutional principles to individual cases.” WHITE, supra 
note 79, at 244. 
 220. 198 U.S. 45, 64–65 (1905). Fiss sees Lochner as being rooted in a con-
ception of the constitutional community that delegated power to government 
over only limited matters. That power did not allow legislation favoring par-
ticular groups such as workers, although there was an exception for certain 
groups who were considered disabled in some sense. FISS, supra note 186, at 
160–61. The state could adopt measures that directly protected the health of 
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ly, in Adair v. United States,221 the Court invalidated a federal 
law that prohibited “yellow dog contracts,” in which employees 
agreed never to join a union.222 But the Court’s decisions during 
that decade have been called “uncertain and jagged,” because 
the Court seemed to lack clear standards and had little guid-
ance from the common law or constitutional precedent.223 For 
instance, although it struck down a maximum hours law for 
bakers in Lochner, it upheld such a law for female workers in 
Muller v. Oregon.224 Outside of the labor area, the Court also 
whittled away at progressive efforts by cutting back on rate 
regulation of railroads.225 
The period between Lochner and 1917 also saw a number 
of rulings favorable to progressive legislation. The Court up-
held a statute that imposed liability on shippers for items dam-
aged in transit.226 It also upheld a federal statute that imposed 
liability on railroads for negligent injury and abolished common 
law defenses such as contributory negligence in those cases.227 
Likewise, the Court upheld congressional power to regulate in-
trastate railroad rates as an adjunct of its regulation of inter-
state rates.228 After 1914, although there were exceptions, fed-
eral reform legislation continued to be upheld in most cases.229 
For instance, the Court upheld the Mann Act,230 which prohibit-
ed the transportation of women in interstate commerce for 
 
workers, but not laws that interfered explicitly with “the freedom of the par-
ties to bargain—a freedom that was seen as the central dynamic of the mar-
ket.” Id. at 164. 
 221. 208 U.S. 161 (1908). 
 222. Fiss explains the decision as resting on the view that complete free-
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the employment relationship.” FISS, supra note 186, at 167. More generally, 
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 223. Id. at 157. 
 224. Id. at 174. 
 225. Id. at 185–221. 
 226. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Riverside Mills, 219 U.S. 186, 208 
(1911). 
 227. Howard v. Ill. Cent. R.R Co. (Employers’ Liability Cases), 207 U.S. 
463, 498 (1908). 
 228. BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 170, at 216–17. In another case up-
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 229. Id. at 415. 
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2015] BACK TO THE FUTURE? 33 
 
“immoral” purposes.231 But, as one Supreme Court historian put 
it, this line of cases “came to a crashing halt” in 1918,232 when 
the Court struck down a federal child labor law as exceeding 
congressional power under the commerce clause.233 Thus, the 
courts were very much involved in the contest between Pro-
gressives and their opponents. 
The influence of the Progressive movement is not hard to 
see in Issue 1. The most obvious example is the article by Judge 
Edward F. Waite.234 Waite seemingly had close ties to the law 
school, because he surfaces again as a key supporter for a later 
law school plan to add courses on legislation, judicial admin-
istration, and the history of law and criminology to the curricu-
lum.235 Waite had been a prosecutor in a major municipal cor-
ruption case, chief of police, and then a judge in Minneapolis.236 
Although racial issues receive only a passing mention in the ar-
ticle, Waite was also a strong advocate of racial equality.237 But 
his main passions were child welfare and juvenile courts.238 
Waite offered a strong endorsement of children’s rights, in-
cluding the right to a fair opportunity to develop the child’s po-
tential.239 He proclaimed the twentieth century “the century of 
the child,” because “[n]ever before have the obligations of socie-
 
 231. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 483 (1917). 
 232. BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 170, at 447. 
 233. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276–77 (1918). 
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Waite explored a range of local issues in his publications and speech-
es. He wrote about the separation between church and state, about 
the condition of minorities in Minneapolis, and about racial segrega-
tion in the city’s public schools. He stressed the importance of over-
coming prejudice, pointing out that facets of identity like race and re-
ligion are determined by chance. 
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 238. Id. Barry Feld links the creation of juvenile courts to changing cultur-
al understandings of childhood: 
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children’s moral and social development. Many Progressive reform 
programs shared a child-centered theme; the juvenile court, child la-
bor and welfare laws, and compulsory school attendance laws reflect-
ed and advanced the changing imagery of childhood. 
Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 
691, 694 (1991). 
 239. Waite, supra note 11, at 52–53. 
34 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:1 
 
ty to its more helpless members been so generally recog-
nized.”240 Waite argued that legislators need to learn from expe-
rience with new laws, which are hardly likely to be perfect 
when they start out.241 The task of suggesting improvements 
was delegated to an expert commission with the goal of bring-
ing Minnesota law up to the “best contemporary thought and 
experience.”242  
In many respects, Waite seems ahead of his time, with his 
plea to consider giving illegitimate children the right to inherit 
from their fathers.243 He castigates the current state of the law 
as “but a slightly humanized survival of the cruel common 
law,—so careful of inheritable property and so careless of inno-
cent and helpless childhood.”244 He also argued that it was time 
to reconsider the exclusion of unmarried women from govern-
ment aid granted to mothers with dependent children.245 Such 
aid was a new idea first adopted in the United States six years 
earlier and in Minnesota four years earlier.246  
But there were also some harsher notes in the article. It is 
disturbing to read his endorsement of sterilization for the men-
tally disabled,247 a practice upheld by the Supreme Court in 
Buck v. Bell.248 Other parts of the discussion manage to be both 
appealing and repelling. He argues for more state control over 
the placement of children for adoption, having had before him 
“children who had been picked up and kept as one might harbor 
a vagrant kitten until a chance occasion brought them into 
court.”249 So far, so good. But he spoils the discussion with his 
example of the inappropriateness of an African American fami-
ly raising a white child who had been left at their door.250  
 
 240. Id. at 48. 
 241. Id. at 49. 
 242. Id. at 51. 
 243. Id. at 55. 
 244. Id.  
 245. Id. at 60. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. at 53–54. 
 248. 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). 
 249. Waite, supra note 11, at 58. 
 250. Id. at 58–59. His language seems a bit condescending: 
It is no reflection upon the good man and woman who cared for him, 
took him into their hearts and wished to keep him as their own, to 
question whether it was well that this relation should continue; but in 
all the great state there was no one whose official duty it was to raise 
that question.  
Id. at 59. Later in life, at least, he seems to have been a champion of racial 
equality. See supra note 237. 
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Thus, Waite’s article reflects both the strengths of the Pro-
gressive movement, such as its willingness to experiment with 
new ways of helping the disadvantaged, and its weaknesses, 
such as its ability to treat those very people as less than equal. 
Both his strengths and his weaknesses were those of the Pro-
gressive moment, not merely his own. 
A second article in Issue 1 also has Progressive affinities. 
Although it is purely doctrinal, its topic is how to draw the 
boundary between governmental control and the public interest 
versus private exploitation of resources.251 The author of the ar-
ticle, Oscar Hallam, was an Associate Justice on the Minnesota 
Supreme Court. He had an academic bent, having joined the 
faculty of the St. Paul School of Law (later William Mitchell 
College of Law), where he became Dean in 1919.252 When he 
later unsuccessfully ran for the Republican nomination for the 
U.S. Senate, he was described as “a progressive, but not of the 
extreme kind.”253  
Justice Hallam at the onset eschews any purpose of dis-
cussing “abstract theories”; instead, he says, he will limit him-
self to the case law.254 In some states, the government held title 
to the land under the water (as well as an interest in the wa-
ters themselves), either in a proprietary capacity (which would 
include ownership of minerals) or in a sovereign capacity.255 In 
terms of states taking the latter view, Hallam says “little more 
can be done than to give the substance of the few decisions that 
we have.”256 He then proceeds to do so, allotting one paragraph 
per case, for seven tedious pages, ending without drawing any 
conclusion of his own.257 The article is well below the others in 
quality, being purely descriptive, but presumably being a Min-
nesota Supreme Court justice gave him a certain amount of 
freedom from the editors’ control. What is most interesting 
about the article is the public-private conflict inherent in the 
topic—a preoccupation of the Progressives—rather than what 
 
 251. Hallam, supra note 10. 
 252. Proceedings in Memory of Associate Justice Ingerval M. Olsen and As-
sociate Justice Oscar Hallam, 220 MINN. REP. xxix (1946), http://mn.gov/ 
lawlib/judges/memorials/Mem220MinnHallam.pdf. 
 253. Primary Monday in Gopher Race, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, June 16, 
1923, at 1. For the benefit of those who hail from further away, it may be 
worth mentioning that the University of Minnesota’s sports mascot is the go-
pher. 
 254. Hallam, supra note 10. 
 255. Id. at 40. 
 256. Id.  
 257. Id. at 40–47. 
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Hallam has to say about it.258 
Some of the student work in Issue 1 also addresses major 
concerns of the Progressive Era. One student note discusses a 
Massachusetts case involving an injunction against a union, 
which was trying to prevent members of a more radical union 
(the Industrial Workers of the World, also known as Wobblies) 
from getting jobs.259 In order to prevent anti-labor injunctions, 
the state legislature had passed a law declaring that the right 
to work is not a form of property, on the assumption that equity 
courts would act only to protect property rights.260 The state 
court declared the state law unconstitutional, but the student 
note argued for a different approach to the case.261 The author 
argued that the supposed rule limiting courts to the protection 
of property interests had been stretched so far as to be mean-
ingless, and that the only test should be irreparable injury.262 
The author concluded that the Massachusetts court was obliged 
“to protect by injunction the personal right of a group of labor-
ers to work, unless it can be said that they have an adequate 
remedy at law.”263 The author then questioned whether “a ver-
dict for damages against a labor organization would be a plain, 
adequate, and complete remedy for being unlawfully deprived 
 
 258. It is unfortunate that Hallam did not delve into the issue more deeply. 
The general topic of the government’s rights and duties involving navigable 
waters became important with the rise of the environmental movement a half 
a century later, in the guise of the public trust doctrine. See Joseph L. 
Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial 
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 471 (1970).  
 259. Property Rights Note, supra note 12. 
 260. Id. at 72. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. at 72–76. The student was well ahead of his times, as shown by 
this discussion of the law almost fifty years later: 
During the course of the nineteenth century, American courts extend-
ed the range of protectible property interests to include the right to do 
business free from various sorts of unfair competition and free from 
picketing. The process has continued during this century, permitting 
injunctions to become increasingly available to protect what had pre-
viously been considered personal rights . . . . An increasing number of 
jurisdictions—perhaps the majority today—have rejected the rule 
outright . . . by holding that “equity will protect personal rights by in-
junction upon the same conditions upon which it will protect property 
rights by injunction.” 
Development in the Law: Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994, 999 (1965). The 
irreparable injury test, in turn, was later criticized as too formalistic and sub-
ject to manipulation to be useful. See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE 
IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 5–7 (1991). Notably, the index to the book does not 
contain an entry for “property” or “property rights.” 
 263. Property Rights Note, supra note 12, at 76. 
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of the right to earn a living.”264 So far as I can tell, the property 
requirement for injunctions is now extinct—two of the remedies 
professors I consulted had never heard of it, and a third 
thought it might perhaps have been found in nineteenth centu-
ry treatises without ever being really followed. But the stu-
dent’s willingness to suggest reform of a long-standing rule of 
law, in a case involving the rights of radical workers, seems no-
table. 
A case note also reflects Progressive thought.265 It discusses 
with approval a case holding that a regulatory commission 
could force one telephone company to connect with another 
company’s phone lines.266 The case note seems to exemplify the 
Progressive Era’s enthusiasm for regulation in the public inter-
est as opposed to private control. 
In at least one way, then, Issue 1 reflected the preoccupa-
tions and concerns of its times. But it was also forward looking 
in its orientation toward law reform, its open discussion of poli-
cy, and its avoidance of formalism. This policy orientation is al-
so clearly present in the current issue of the Review, nearly a 
century later.267 Like the student note about telephone inter-
connection, two of the articles deal with the need to adapt the 
law to changing technologies.268 Indeed, another article in the 
Issue devotes considerable attention to Lochner-era cases that 
so upset the Progressives.269 Thus, we continue today, in many 
ways, to pursue an intellectual agenda that now goes back at 
least a century, of bringing law into tune with technological 
and social changes through the use of policy analysis. 
 
 264. Id.  
 265. See generally Recent Cases, Telephones—Physical Connection—
Eminent Domain—Police Power, 1 MINN. L. REV. 95 (1917). 
 266. Id. 
 267. For instance, Katharine Baker argues that discrimination law pro-
vides a better method than criminal law for controlling nonconsensual sexual 
behavior on campus. Katharine K. Baker, Why Rape Should Not (Always) Be a 
Crime, 100 MINN. L. REV. 221 (2015).  
 268. See Derek E. Bambauer, Against Jawboning, 100 MINN. L. REV. 51 
(2015) (contending that the government’s use of “jawboning” as an informal 
regulatory technique should be limited, with particular reference to the Inter-
net); Alexandra B. Klass & Jim Rossi, Revitalizing Dormant Commerce Clause 
Review for Interstate Coordination, 100 MINN. L. REV. 129 (2015) (arguing that 
the new realities of interstate electricity transmission require changes in the 
law governing the approval of new power lines).  
 269. Jane R. Bambauer & Toni M. Massaro, Outrageous and Irrational, 
100 MINN. L. REV. 281, 323–31 (2015).  
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IV.  THE LAW SCHOOL AND THE BROADER WORLD   
The year 1917 was, as it turned out, nearly the end of the 
Progressive Era. For it was not to be long before the United 
States was drawn into World War I, shifting the nation’s priori-
ties and putting reform on the back burner until the New Deal. 
Issue 1 was not blind to the risk of war, nor was it parochially 
confined to the domestic sphere in its view of the law. 
A. THE ROAD TO WORLD WAR I 
Europe had been at war since the summer of 1914, with a 
half a million men killed in the first month of the war alone.270 
The war ended almost fifty years of peace in Europe.271  
It rapidly became clear that the war was not going to end 
any time soon, and Wilson adopted a policy of neutrality in the 
hope that the belligerents would eventually turn to the United 
States to mediate the conflict.272 He also feared that war would 
bring out the worst in American society.273 Initially, loans to 
any of the belligerents were banned, but this ban was weak-
ened substantially and then abandoned once it became clear 
that it would tip the balance of power in favor of the Ger-
mans.274  
The biggest sore spot concerned the right of the United 
States to trade with the belligerent parties under international 
law.275 Britain imposed an embargo on Germany, with the re-
sult that in two years American trade with Germany collapsed, 
while trade with England, France, and Italy tripled.276 The 
German effort to cut off trade with Britain was the main cause 
for the United States’ entrance into the war.277 Tensions esca-
lated in 1915 when the Germans announced they would sink 
neutral vessels approaching or leaving the British Isles.278 Poli-
cies on both sides vacillated, as the Germans made fitful efforts 
to placate the Americans and Wilson continued to pursue a role 
as a neutral mediator. A series of German attacks on ships dis-
rupted these efforts at reconciliation. The best remembered is a 
German submarine’s sinking, without warning, of the English 
 
 270. CLEMENTS, supra note 189, at 115. 
 271. Id. at 114. 
 272. Id. at 116. 
 273. JOHNSON, supra note 196, at 643. 
 274. CLEMENTS, supra note 189, at 116–18. 
 275. Id. at 119–20. 
 276. JOHNSON, supra note 196, at 644. 
 277. Id. at 643. 
 278. CLEMENTS, supra note 189, at 123–25. 
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passenger ship Lusitania, killing 1201 passengers and crew 
members including 128 Americans.279 One modern historian 
calls this “an international crime without precedent or mitigat-
ing circumstance.”280 Relations somewhat stabilized after the 
Germans adopted a more limited approach to submarine war-
fare.281 But this stability did not last. 
Ultimately, the Germans decided that if they could cut off 
trade to Britain, they could win the war before the United 
States could effectively intervene.282 On January 31, 1917, they 
again announced a policy of sinking all ships near the British 
Isles.283 This policy had originally been supported by the mili-
tary but was opposed by the civilian leadership until a confer-
ence with the Kaiser.284 The new German policy led to what has 
been called “an appalling slaughter of seamen and civilian pas-
sengers in the Atlantic sea-lanes.”285 Wilson broke off diplomat-
ic relations with Germany.286 After learning of the sinking of 
three American ships, Wilson convened a special session of 
Congress, which declared war on April 2.  
Public opinion in Minnesota began as heavily neutralist, 
with blame for the war placed on the European political system 
rather than either side.287 As one historian put it, “[w]hat most 
Americans thought they saw in Europe was a conflict between 
two unprincipled power blocs, neither of which had a sufficient 
moral edge to warrant risking American neutrality.”288 Rural 
Minnesotans and urban workers embraced neutrality.289 By 
1916, however, American opinion was more divided.290 The 
German-American, Scandinavian, and Irish communities re-
mained strongly anti-interventionist.291 Those of Anglo-Saxon 
descent, however, favored intervention on the side of the Al-
 
 279. Id. at 125.  
 280. JOHNSON, supra note 196, at 537. 
 281. CHRISLOCK, supra note 193, at 91. 
 282. CLEMENTS, supra note 189, at 137–38. 
 283. Id. at 138. 
 284. CHRISLOCK, supra note 193, at 128–29. 
 285. JOHNSON, supra note 196, at 537. Tensions were also increased by 
publication of a secret telegram from Germany to the Mexican government 
proposing a joint offensive alliance against the United States. Id. at 537–38. 
 286. Id. 
 287. CHRISLOCK, supra note 193, at 69. 
 288. Id. at 75. 
 289. Id. at 93. 
 290. Id. at 91. 
 291. Id. at 100. 
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lies.292 Thus, in January 2017 when Issue 1 appeared, a divided 
nation was teetering on the edge of the precipice. 
B. THE MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW AND THE INTERNATIONAL 
SPHERE 
The threatening prospect of war did not escape the notice 
of the law review, and the issue of neutrality was the subject of 
the lead article in the issue.293 C. D. Allin, the author of the ar-
ticle, was a member of the University of Minnesota political 
science department whose expertise included political theory, 
political parties, and English constitutional law.294 He went to 
college at the University of Toronto, studied for a year as a 
graduate student at Harvard, and then served as an instructor 
at Stanford for three years.295 He continued his graduate stud-
ies in Berlin and at Oxford, and before coming to Minnesota 
had taught at Queen’s University, where he published a book 
on the origins of Australian federalism.296 
 
 292. Id.  
 293. Allin, supra note 8, at 1. 
 294. We learn something of his interests from a notice in The Daily Palo 
Alto four years later describing his teaching areas there: 
Professor Allin will give a course in Political Theory showing the his-
torical development of political ideas from the classical period to the 
present, with special reference to such topics as the nature of the 
state; the right of the individual; the doctrine of sovereignty; and gen-
eral will and the separation of powers.  
  He will also give a course in the Government and Politics of the 
British Empire, with the organization and workings of the English 
and Imperial constitutions. 
Professor C. D. Allin To Teach Political Science, THE DAILY PALO ALTO, Mar. 
6, 1923, at 3, http://stanforddailyarchive.com/cgi-bin/stanford?a=d&d=stanford 
19230306-01.2.38.  
 295. Allin may also have had training in economics. An earlier article in 
the Stanford Daily refers to C. D. Allin as a former instructor of economics 
there. Return of Professor Marx, THE DAILY PALO ALTO, Sept. 7, 1904, at 1, 
http://stanforddailyarchive.com/cgi-bin/stanford?a=d&d=stanford19040907-01 
.2.6&e. But this was probably an error, particularly as the primary subject of 
the story was someone else. 
 296. See 8 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO MONTHLY 91 (1907–1908). The same 
volume also contains a short review of Allin’s book on Australian federation by 
S.J. McLean, which emphasizes the way Allin connected constitutional issues 
to social dynamics: 
Mr. Allin has made a real contribution in the field of political science. 
His study of the movement in Australia shows that in governmental, 
as well as more technically juristic matters, the position of Savigny, 
that continuing institutions are a part of a country’s life, not some-
thing superimposed, holds good. 
S.J. McClean, The Early Federation Movement of Australia, in 8 UNIVERSITY 
OF TORONTO MONTHLY 81, 82 (1907–1908). 
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Allin’s article in Issue 1 concerned a British ship, the 
Appam, which had been seized by the Germans and taken into 
an American port.297 The question was whether the Germans 
had forfeited their rights to the ship by taking it to a neutral 
port and keeping it there.298 A treaty between the United States 
and Prussia, originally entered into in 1799, by its terms al-
lowed free access in such cases to neutral ports, but the United 
States had taken the position that this language was limited to 
use of neutral ports under escort by the ship that had captured 
the prize, a view that Allin disputed.299 It was a closer question, 
however, whether the captured ship was entitled to long-term 
refuge in the American port or only to a temporary stop for 
purposes such as repair or refuge from a storm.300 Practices by 
different nations, and even by the United States itself, were not 
consistent.301 Allin concluded, however, that the rule limiting 
the prize to temporary purposes was “considerably in advance 
of the generally accepted principles of international law,” “gain-
ing in favor” but not yet embraced by all of the “family of na-
tions.”302 Given the rule’s unclear acceptance by the community 
of nations, Allin argued that Germany was not bound by the 
rule in the absence of a public declaration prior to the ship’s en-
try by the United States government.303  
The district court exercised jurisdiction over the ship on 
the ground that “the entrance of the Appam into a United 
States port to escape capture constituted . . . a violation of neu-
 
 297. Allin, supra note 8. Prize law has little direct practical significance 
today given changes in methods of warfare, but still has left an imprint on 
many doctrines in international law: 
Regulation of naval prizes is part of the public international law con-
cerned with war and neutrality. One of the prerogatives of warfare 
has been the capture of the enemy’s property and the transfer of its 
possession and ownership to the apprehending State and its citizens. 
While the taking of enemy property on land as booty became the sub-
ject of international legal regulation (through codification) only early 
in this century, controls on the seizure of an adversary’s ships and 
cargoes—as well as those of neutral powers—have preoccupied the 
minds of masters, merchants, and naval officers (along with their 
lawyers) since the early Middle Ages. The law of naval prize has an 
extraordinarily rich history, longer and deeper than perhaps any oth-
er discrete subject matter in the law of nations. 
David J. Bederman, The Feigned Demise of Prize, 9 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 31, 
33 (1995) (footnotes omitted). 
 298. Allin, supra note 8. 
 299. Id. at 2. 
 300. Id. at 3. 
 301. Id. at 5. 
 302. Id. at 6. 
 303. Id. 
42 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:1 
 
trality.”304 But Allin observed that no American court had taken 
such a position and that it was contrary to the view of the State 
Department.305 In short, Allin said, the lower court’s view was 
“considerably in advance of the accepted principles of interna-
tional law.”306  
Allin admitted that the district court’s views were “excel-
lent in themselves” and that some of them would probably be 
incorporated into international law.307 Still, “it is scarcely possi-
ble for a neutral court or government to modify the rules of in-
ternational law to the disadvantage of one or the other of the 
parties during the course of a world-wide war.”308 In any event, 
it was for Congress, not the courts, to bring the neutrality laws 
of the United States up to date, since the government “has got-
ten itself into an embarrassing situation by allowing its trea-
ties and neutrality laws to fall so far behind the more enlight-
ened practices of other nations.”309 It is not hard to see the 
contemporary anxiety over maintaining the country’s neutral 
status at work in Allin’s argument against what the Germans 
might regard as an unfriendly act.310  
 
 304. Id. at 7. 
 305. Id. at 8. 
 306. Id. at 9. 
 307. Id.  
 308. Id.  
 309. Id. The Supreme Court took a different view: 
The principles of international law recognized by this government, 
leaving the treaty aside, will not permit the ports of the United States 
to be thus used by belligerents. If such use were permitted, it would 
constitute of the ports of a neutral country harbors of safety into 
which prizes, captured by one of the belligerents, might be safely 
brought and indefinitely kept. 
Berg v. British & African Steam Navigation Co., 243 U.S. 124, 149 (1917). In-
deed, the Court said, 
Were the rule otherwise . . . our ports might be filled in case of a gen-
eral war such as is now in progress between the European countries, 
with captured prizes of one or the other of the belligerents, in utter 
violation of the principles of neutral obligation which have controlled 
this country from the beginning. 
Id. at 156. The decision was handed down on March 6, after the Germans an-
nounced their policy of sinking all ships in the vicinity of England but about a 
month before the United States declared war. 
 310. The Harvard Law Review agreed with Allin: 
This policy, enunciated again in the principal case, must inevitably 
result in the destruction at sea of vessels that would otherwise be 
harbored until the close of war; but, unless disturbed by the Supreme 
Court, its adoption by us seems certain. 
The Case of the Appam, 30 HARV. L. REV. 161, 162 (1916) (footnote omitted). 
However, the Yale Law Journal disagreed: 
Inasmuch as the bringing of the Appam into Hampton Roads was in 
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Allin’s was not the only internationally-oriented article in 
Issue 1, which also contained a comparative study of an issue 
in the conflict of laws.311 The author was Minnesota Professor 
Ernest Gustav Lorenzen, who had succeeded Vance as dean at 
George Washington and then taught at the University of Wis-
consin.312 Lorenzen was raised in Germany, went to college in 
the United States, and returned to Germany for a doctorate in 
law.313 Despite his German origins, he apparently was passion-
ate in his American patriotism.314 His interest in European civil 
law was apparently disdained at Harvard, and Yale had re-
fused to hire him when a faculty member called his views “not 
only heretical but logically indefensible.”315 Lorenzen was seem-
ingly something of a workaholic but said that he had agreed to 
give up working Sundays for a year after his marriage in honor 
of his new bride.316 He left Minnesota for Yale after 1917; ap-
parently the objecting Yale faculty member either became rec-
onciled to his heresies, departed, or was outvoted.317 Lorenzen 
was included later in a list of legal realists,318 along with Vance. 
The title of Lorenzen’s article, “The Rules of the Conflict of 
Laws Applicable to Bills and Notes: A Study in Comparative 
 
violation of our neutral rights, and of our established policy, as shown 
by our rejection of Article XXIII of the Hague Convention relative to 
giving asylum to a prize, restitution was rightfully made to the origi-
nal owners. This was done by virtue of the res itself being within the 
control of the District Court of Virginia, and of its general jurisdiction 
as a district court to take cognizance of questions of prize, exclusive of 
German prize court proceedings. 
George Stewart, Jr., Editorial, Jurisdiction of the United States Courts in the 
Case of the Appam, 26 YALE L.J. 148, 150 (1916). 
 311. Lorenzen, supra note 9. 
 312. STEIN, supra note 85, at 50. 
 313. Arthur L. Corbin, Ernest Gustav Lorenzen, 60 YALE L.J. 579 (1951). 
 314. Id. Corbin tells the story of how, when Lorenzen was in Washington 
and the Capitol suddenly came into view, Lorenzen exclaimed “My Country!” 
Id. 
 315. STEIN, supra note 85, at 50. 
 316. Id. at 51. 
 317. Id. at 66–67. However, Lorenzen’s time at Yale may not have been en-
tirely happy. According to Kalman, his teaching was considered too tradition-
alist, at least by more intellectually adventuresome students, and he de-
camped for Harvard in 1930. KALMAN, supra note 35, at 103. Kalman’s 
account is a little at odds with Corbin’s description of Lorenzen’s affectionate 
relationship with the students, but perhaps Corbin was putting a favorable 
spin on things in his memorial essay. Corbin, supra note 313, at 580. In any 
event, by 1947, Yale initiated and financed a book collecting many of his writ-
ings on conflicts. See ERNEST G. LORENZEN, SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE CON-
FLICT OF LAWS (1947). 
 318. Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean 
Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1226–27 (1931). 
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Law,” is hardly likely to generate excitement among readers 
today.319 Two things are notable about the article, however. One 
is Lorenzen’s careful attention to the rules of foreign jurisdic-
tions as a guide (even though they were often contrary to Amer-
ican case law). The other is Lorenzen’s focus on practical conse-
quences rather than conceptual purity, contrary to the 
formalism that generally still reigned at the time.320  
The article focuses on the situation where the person sign-
ing a promissory note or bill lacks capacity to contract—either 
because of youth or because the person was a married woman 
in a jurisdiction that disallowed contracts by wives.321 The con-
flict of law issue arises when the rules differ between the juris-
diction of the signer’s residence or citizenship and the jurisdic-
tion where the transaction occurs. For instance, a seventeen-
year-old might be competent to enter a contract in her home 
country, but might sign a promissory note for a loan in a coun-
try where the legal age of contracting is eighteen. Is the prom-
issory note binding on her in either of those jurisdictions or in a 
third jurisdiction where enforcement might be sought? 
Lorenzen analyzes how this type of problem is handled in Eng-
land, the United States, France, Germany, and Italy.322 He crit-
icizes professors in “the theoretical atmosphere of their study” 
for adopting an unrealistic position, in contrast with interna-
tional associations had taken into account “the actual needs of 
business life.”323  
Lorenzen then asks what “sound policy” requires in this 
situation.324 In passing, he rejects two leading theories of con-
flicts law, one based on territoriality and the other on the pre-
sumed intent of the parties, as not leading to “satisfactory re-
sults.”325 He then tries to balance the policies at stake. He 
concedes that the rule favored by the international associations 
would be “practicable,” in that it would promote the negotiabil-
 
 319. Lorenzen, supra note 9. 
 320. Lorenzen opposed the Restatement of Conflicts because it classified 
“completely dissimilar situations under a general abstract principle.” KALMAN, 
supra note 35, at 27. At Yale, he continued to oppose “the judicial and scholar-
ly practice of lumping together cases in which ‘domicile’ gave the courts juris-
diction to divorce, tax, and determine inheritance.” Id. at 23. Instead, he 
showed that “regardless of what courts said, the judicial definition of ‘domicile’ 
varied according to the fact situation involved.” Id. at 24. Kalman cites him as 
an early legal realist. Id. at 101. 
 321. Lorenzen, supra note 9, at 11. 
 322. Id. at 11–18.  
 323. Id. at 18. 
 324. Id. at 27. 
 325. Id. at 29. 
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ity of bills and notes and would help harmonize the British and 
American approaches with “the best thought on the subject in 
continental Europe.”326 But on the other hand, the United 
States alone could not ensure uniform treatment by other coun-
tries, and this rule might lead to increased litigation in cases 
where the domicile (but not the place of contracting) allowed 
the contract.327 On balance, Lorenzen concludes that the disad-
vantages of the proposed rule outweigh the advantages, so that 
any uniform law on the subject should stick to the place of the 
contract as the sole test.328 Thus, Lorenzen looks to practical 
consequences rather than fundamental principles to resolve the 
issue, in a distinctly modern way. 
In addition to these internationally-oriented lead articles, 
one student’s case comment discussed an issue relating to the 
war.329 A corporation was organized in England before the war; 
all but one of the shareholders were German.330 The corporation 
filed suit after war broke out to recover money that was due be-
fore the war.331 The House of Lords ruled that “to allow the suit 
would be to permit the payment of money to the King’s ene-
mies.”332 Although the English court went further than Ameri-
can courts had in piercing the corporate veil, the student au-
thor approved.333 In the author’s view, the court was right to 
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override the “technical theory of the separate entity of the cor-
poration” and to hold that the corporation’s nationality was 
“that of the men who controlled and directed its affairs.”334 “To 
hold the contrary,” said the author, “would be to allow a mere 
legal fiction to outweigh the palpable fact.”335 Not very formal-
ist! 
It is worth noting that, although his work does not appear 
in Issue 1, Dean Vance also took an interest in international 
law. In two pamphlets, one published in 1915 and the other 
just a month after Issue 1, he advocated creation of a World 
Court.336 He defended this idea on the basis of the role that the 
U.S. Supreme Court had played in unifying the nation and re-
solving disputes between state governments.337 Although he 
admitted that such a court would not be successful when vital 
matters of nation security were in conflict, he considered that it 
could do much to resolve lesser disputes.338 
  CONCLUSION   
This Article has recounted the “life and times” of Issue 1. 
Apart from the sheer interest of exploring a bygone era in the 
life of the legal academy, there are some broader morals to the 
story. One is that the usual picture of the development of legal 
thought is too simplistic, positing an era of unremitting formal-
ism followed by the dazzling counterpoint of legal realism in 
around the time of the New Deal. Signs of realism began to 
emerge earlier, and not just at Columbia or Yale. The idea that 
law can be a tool of social policy did not suddenly burst forth in 
the New Deal era. It was already percolating in the law school 
world a dozen years before the 1929 crash. 
There are also some lessons that are commonplace in the 
study of history, but always still a bit jarring. One is about the 
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contingency and erratic evolution of institutions. We learn that 
student law reviews, which are now so deeply entrenched in the 
American academy, arose in a haphazard way and did not 
reach their final form (complete student control) everywhere 
until much later. We also learn how much scholarly thought is 
shaped by its time period, with the developments first of the 
Progressive Era and then of the slide toward involvement in 
World War I, setting the intellectual agenda. It is easy to see 
that in retrospect; it is harder to realize that someday, future 
scholars will describe our own work as merely “typical early 
twenty-first-century scholarship.” Our own values may some-
day appear as forward looking in some ways and yet as back-
ward in others as Judge Waite’s views on non-marital children, 
children’s rights, and eugenics. 
Yet at the same time we learn that the intellectual per-
spective of the time is not as foreign to us as we might have ex-
pected. Lorenzen’s effort to balance conflicting policies is remi-
niscent of many articles today. Issue 1 contains 
interdisciplinary scholarship (in the form of Allin’s contribution 
as a political scientist); advocacy of social change (by Judge 
Waite); and an international/comparative law orientation (Allin 
and Lorenzen). No one who reads modern law reviews will find 
this mix of articles terribly surprising. This can be seen as a 
tribute to the forward-thinking authors and editors of Issue 1, 
and it may also be a sign that Minnesota was an early haven 
for what would later become recognized as the Realist move-
ment. 
When we debate legal formalism today, we might learn 
something through a closer look at how it was actually prac-
ticed in an earlier era and what its critics actually saw as its 
weaknesses, as opposed to relying on second-half caricatures of 
both perspectives. And by understanding something of the con-
tingency of current practices and how they have evolved, we 
may help open our eyes to possibilities for further change. If 
law schools have changed so much since the days of Dean 
Pattee, when the law school was the last refuge for academical-
ly failing athletes, perhaps they can change again, in equally 
surprising and unexpected directions. 
As the Minnesota Law Review moves toward its second 
century, it has been enlightening to look back at the beginning 
of its first century. Taken as a whole, the first issue was an 
auspicious start for the Review. It began nearly a century339 of 
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deep intellectual engagement with the major issues facing our 
legal system. May the next century be equally successful. 
 
